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ABSTRACT
THE SEMIOSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORIZING THE MEDIA IN
POSTCOLONIAL POLITIES
FEBRUARY 2015
SRINIVAS R. LANKALA, B.A., NIZAM COLLEGE, OSMANIA UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF HYDERABAD
M.Phil., JAWAHARLAL NEHRU UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Briankle G. Chang.
My dissertation is an attempt to construct a theoretical framework for the
distinctive nature of the mass media in the postcolonial political context through an
engagement with the theoretical legacy of Indian political theory and historiography,
especially the Subaltern Studies school. I draw from Partha Chatterjee’s
conceptualization of Indian politics as divided into the two spheres of civil and political
society and interpret these political categories through the rubric of mass media and
televisual discourse, both to locate the mass media in the discourse and practice of
politics, and to also locate political practice as it takes place in a mediatized context.
To extend Chatterjee’s understanding of the postcolonial polity, I map these
political categories to Jean Baudrillard’s understanding of human communication that is
divided between the symbolic and semiotic domains. I trace Baudrillard’s theoretical
trajectory from Durkheim and Marx through social anthropology and media theory. I also
try to interpret his categories through Marx’s concept of the subsumption of labor under
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capital as a metaphor to understand how the thread of capitalist modernity runs through
them.
I posit that the nation-form is the essential embodiment of capitalist modernity in
the context of a mediatized political sphere where the nation is essentially what
Baudrillard calls a simulacrum, and I try to understand it as a semiotic discourse that is
located within the realm of civil society. I explore this aspect of the relationship between
media and politics through instances of the mass-mediation of the symbolic domain of
political society.
Finally I argue that it is the symbolic domain that is the dominant aspect of
communication in the postcolonial context, and it is a recovery of the symbolic that will
provide a political challenge radical enough to destabilize the semiotic realm of capitalist
modernity. This recovery can only take place if the mass media shifts its location from
civil society to the democratic challenges of political society. A radical theory of the
media in the postcolonial context will be one that will enable this shift by critically
engaging with the absences and silences of the symbolic within current media discourse.
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CHAPTER 1
TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE MEDIA IN POSTCOLONIAL SOCIETIES

I. Introduction
The present work is a meditation on the nature and role of the media in a
postcolonial context, and an attempt at delineating a theoretical approach to the media in
India, based on the epistemological categories of Indian political theory and postcolonial
historiography.
To this end, there are certain terminological categories that are used without a
thorough historical exposition of their range of meanings. One of these is the idea of
‘modernity’, which I use to mean the historical phase of European colonial rule starting
that is also coterminous with the rise and dominance of European capitalism as a both a
historical movement as well as an ideological discourse. Other categories such as the
‘state’, the ‘nation’ and ‘civil society’ that are essential to my arguments also have a
diversity of meanings that are not acknowledged by my own usage. I have tried to explain
the restricted sense in which I use them wherever necessary in the text. For instance, my
understanding of the ‘nation’ as a discursive formation that follows the spread of
capitalism and its creation of public spheres anchored in the print media is borrowed from
Benedict Anderson’s historical concept of the modern nation as an ‘imagined
community’:
“In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of
people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds of
thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through
print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally
imagined community.…the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity
of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its
basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation”. (Anderson 1991, p. 44-45)
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Similarly, by the ‘postcolonial world’, I imply what Partha Chatterjee has called
‘most of the world’ (Chatterjee 2004), including within this term, the regions of the world
which were subject to the transformational effects of the ideologies represented by
modernity: I understand the spread of colonialism as inseparable from the rise of
capitalism, and these historical movements are linked through the ideological structures
that are understood by the term ‘modernity’. Here, I understand the post-colonial to mean
that which is produced by colonialism, or the state of coloniality, rather than an indication
of a stage of historical development.
“What I mean by ‘most of the world’… [is] those parts of the world that were not direct
participants in the history of the evolution of the institutions of modern capitalist democracy.
‘Modern capitalist democracy’ might, in a loose way, be taken to mean the modern West.
But…the modern West has a significant presence in many modern non-Western societies, just as,
indeed, there are large sectors of contemporary Western society that are not necessarily part of the
historical entity known as the modern West. However, if I were to make a rough estimate of the
number of people in the world who would be, in a conceptual sense, included within my
description of popular politics, I would say that I am talking of the political life of well over threefourths of contemporary humanity.” (Chatterjee 2004, p.3)

In this chapter, I begin with the need for a new approach to theory construction in
media studies in the postcolonial world. Taking India as an emblematic example I try to
provide the ground for a deeper examination of existing media theory and how political
theory can provide a more meaningful foundation for the construction of a new theory of
the media.

II. Thinking Media through Political Theory
The difference between the postcolonial nation-states and the polities of their
colonizing powers has been theorized effectively in the field of political theory and
cultural studies. New forms of historiography, notably the Subaltern Studies school, have
inspired a fundamentally different way of explaining and understanding the histories of
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postcolonial societies. Other fields of social-scientific research however, have been
trapped in a metropolitan framework that is rooted in the singular historical trajectories of
Western European nation-states. The incomplete decolonization of academic and policy
institutions has allowed the awkward insertion of postcolonial histories of the present into
the social and political framework that obtains in the colonizing world. This has led to a
lack of theoretical language to engage with the cultural reality of postcolonial polities and
their unique trajectories both during and after colonial rule.
The study of mass media has been one casualty of this inability to develop a new
theoretical and philosophical framework for mass communication in the postcolonial
world. The failure to understand the singularity of mass media institutions and texts that
are located and produced in the postcolonial world and the indiscriminate application of a
theoretical language rooted in the culturally specific phenomenon of the European
enlightenment has occurred primarily because of the lack of sui generis philosophical
tools that explain postcolonial mass media through a postcolonial lens.
This chapter, and the ones that follow, take India as an emblematic instance of a
postcolonial political context and attempt to explain its mass media through a
philosophical understanding of its location and role in social and political structures.
To do so, without lapsing in to a media-centric view of society that is the bane of such
attempts at theoretical constructions, these essays locate mass media within the larger
framework of postcolonial polity. Rather than a cultural or sociologically based
theoretical framework, this work seeks to harness political theory and philosophy in order
to locate and explain mass media. The reasons are twofold:
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1. A cultural theory of Indian mass media would be a vast undertaking, and would
not be very useful considering the lack of a ‘national’ culture in the European
sense. ‘Indian’ media, in a social or cultural sense, thus is not a valid term and is
not meaningful in an empirical or theoretical sense, given the diversity of subnational cultures, languages and language families.
2. India, like other postcolonial countries, is a nation-state constituted through
colonial rule and anti-colonial nationalism: ‘India’ as a singular unit, is thus
nothing but polity, and there is nothing left of any other older or alternative
political structures except the singular national polity created and bequeathed
through colonialism. However, unlike other colonized countries, this is the result
of a unique compromise that the Indian national bourgeoisie made with its
colonial masters during the last phase of the anti-colonial national movement
(Chatterjee 1993). This has resulted in a political structure that draws a thick line
between the social and the political and has led to the contradictions inherent in its
polity that are the determining characteristics of its mass media as well. These
contradictions are at the heart of the chapters that follow and are the foundation
for the construction of a media theory that is attempted therein.

Indian political theory is also advanced enough to have generated a unique
perspective of understanding these contradictions. Because of the pioneering efforts of
the Subaltern Studies school historians, political theory that is based in these
historiographical exercises has produced innovative and theoretically meaningful
understandings of the polity. Drawing on the fundamental political concepts of the state,
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civil society and political society, theorists such as Partha Chatterjee, Dipesh
Chakrabarty, Sudipta Kaviraj and others have attempted to characterize the singularities
of the Indian polity through a unique theoretical interpretation of these enlightenment
terms.
A second imperative that drives this theoretical construction of the mass media in
terms of theories of the polity is the relationship between mass media and contemporary
politics: the media is increasingly a location of political discourse, to the extent that
political discourse is primarily a mediated experience for a large part of the population.
While this is true of all media-saturated societies, it holds greater import for India
because of the contradiction between the political discourse that is mediated and the
actual practice of politics as it exists outside the media. The ideological elements that
dominate political discourse in India: issues of nationalism, sub-national movements,
secularism, caste and gender identity, and the contingent issues that animate these
elements such as political corruption, terrorism, discrimination and xenophobia are, to a
large extent, mediated discourses. This means the bulk of Indians experience these issues,
or even consider them issues in the first place, due their prevalence in mass media
narratives.
While this perspective might appear to place an undue emphasis on the mass media as
playing an animating role in politics, the structural relationship between media and
politics goes much deeper and is more complex. Subsequent chapters will argue that this
is the result of a foundational contradiction in the Indian nation-state, and is true of all
postcolonial states, where a liberal, ostensibly non-colonial, political order is built upon
an existing non-modern, non-European polity that co-exists, yet is hidden by the screen
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of the liberal political arrangement that mimics the arrangement of civil society and the
state in western Europe.
A brief excursus through the current scholarship on political theory in India at this
juncture will enable me to move towards a foundation for a theoretical engagement with
the mass media as part of politics.
The strand of political theory that is of interest to the arguments in these chapters is
the school that is descended from the Subaltern Studies group of historians, who, in the
1980s and 1990s attempted to recast historiography of the colonial encounter as it would
be observed ‘from below’, gleaned from texts and narratives that dealt with the actions of
the colonized. This was in opposition to the prevalent trend of using official and colonial
texts and discourses as the primary sources of historical data. In shifting their gaze to the
other side, the Subaltern historians aimed to avoid both the replication of the colonial
ideological narrative as well as its mirror image that was found in the nativist discourses
of elite nationalists.
The Subaltern Studies group found their name in a concept from Antonio Gramsci
which referred to the ideological functionaries of the rulers. Early work of the school
focused on elucidating the Gramscian concept of hegemony in the colonial context. By
looking at moments in colonial political history that they termed counter-hegemonic, and
that were located in small, everyday acts of resistance and rebellion, the school’s
historians tried to avoid the trap of valorizing nationalist historiography that emerged as
the hagiographic narration of an elite movement against colonial rule (Chakrabarty 2000).
The subaltern, in their redefinition of the term became the figure who represented the
non-modern, who was not part of the colonial or nationalist narrative because these
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narratives were both two aspects of the same modernity. As Gayatri Spivak clarified, the
subaltern is not simply a synonym for the oppressed, or the marginal, or the colonized, all
of which are simply categories of the same modern narratives, but was a representative of
the figure that could not be spoken of in the language of modernity and was therefore
absent (Spivak 2005).
“Subalternity cannot be generalised according to hegemonic logic. That is what makes it subaltern.
Yet it is a category and therefore repeatable…	
  Subalternity is a position without identity. It is
somewhat like the strict understanding of class. Class is not a cultural origin, it is a sense of
economic collectivity, of social relations of formation as the basis of action. Gender is not lived
sexual difference. It is a sense of the collective social negotiation of sexual differences as the basis
of action. ‘Race’ is not originary; it assumes racism. Subalternity is where social lines of mobility,
being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognisable basis of action.” (Spivak 2005,
p.475-476)

Political theorists associated with this school then used this methodology to
theorize the postcolonial polity that they understood as having descended from colonial
antecedents and incorporating many of the contradictions inherent in the latter. Prominent
among these were Partha Chatterjee, Sudipta Kaviraj and Dipesh Chakrabarty.
Chakrabarty’s thesis focused on the construction of the postcolonial national as an
essentially European institution (Chakrabarty 2000). Kaviraj’s work describes the
nationalist movement and the fashioning of a unitary nation-state after decolonization as
an elite attempt to incorporate European political and civic ideals into a non-European
social reality (Kaviraj 2010) .
“The colonial period saw the appearance of two types of divisions in Indian society: the discursive
division between those who made the world they inhabited intelligible via modernist discourse,
and those who did not. This division ran decisively between the Indian elite and the lower orders.
On top of it, however, nationalism put in place a political division between colonialism and the
Indian nation”. (Kaviraj 2010, p.23)

Kaviraj and Khilnani’s work on the civil society in India also echoes Chatterjee’s
radically new understanding of civil society in the postcolonial world and his distinction
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between civil society, political society and the state, that he draws from its original
Hegelian sense towards a more accurate reflection of the way political life is lived in a
postcolonial society like India (Kaviraj 2001). Other political theorists have tried to
understand and problematize fundamental concepts such as secularism, community,
social movements, social hierarchies of caste, ethnicity and gender which are all deeply
embedded in Indian political and popular discourse but whose quotidian use belies their
provenance in European modernity and is fundamentally at odds with their original sense
in their European contexts. Instead of drawing from their applied meanings in European
political thought, contemporary debates in Indian political theory have attempted to
refashion these terms in ways that reflect their actual usage and existence in the Indian
reality (Chandhoke 2002; Bhandari 2006). Chatterjee’s theorization of civil and political
society, their historical trajectory and current understanding is the most ambitious of
these attempts and is part of a larger wave of political theory that is re-theorizing and
redefining modernity in order to draw it away from its current incarnation in existing
discourse towards a sense that in which it is experienced and understood by the majority
of people it affects (Chatterjee 1998).
To a large extent, this has involved the recognition of multiple fissures and
divisions in the ways in which these terms are understood within India itself. The
fundamental split, explicitly theorized by Chatterjee, but present in some form or other in
all the new debates is one between a colonial élite which rules and the mass of the
population which is ‘governed’. Chatterjee uses the idea of a governmental state to
explain the relation between the population and the state, even while the ruling élite
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inhabits a relation to the state that reflects the classic European bourgeois ideal of
citizenship.
“Population, then, constitutes the material of society. Unlike the family in classical theory, the
concept of population is descriptive and empirical, not normative. Indeed, population is assumed
to contain large elements of ‘naturalness’ and ‘primordiality’; the internal principles of the
constitution of particular population groups are not expected to be rationally explicable since they
are not the products of rational contractual association but are, as it were, pre-rational. What the
concept of population does, however, is make available for governmental functions (economic
policy, bureaucratic administration, law, and political mobilization) a set of rationally manipulable
instruments for reaching large sections of the inhabitants of a country as the targets of ‘policy’”.
(Chatterjee 1998, p.62)

Chatterjee, like Kaviraj, traces the roots of this contradiction to the ‘passive
revolution’ that both created the native Indian bourgeoisie as a class, and ushered in the
postcolonial nation-state led by the same national bourgeoisie as the successor to the
colonial state (Kaviraj, 1988, 2010; Chatterjee, 1993) . Drawing on Gramsci’s notion of
the passive resolution as a substitute for a true revolutionary class and as a ‘revolution
from above’, Chatterjee explains how nationalist thought evolved under colonial rule as
the reflection of the colonialists’ worldview and supplied the paternalist ideology of
‘development’ that the postcolonial state used as its foundational logic for hegemonic
rule and its identity as the true agent of change in a postcolonial society, and a substitute
for a revolutionary class (Chatterjee, 1986).

III. The Postcolonial Distinction
The persistence of coloniality in the post-colony can thus be understood as the
result of the continuity of the role of the national bourgeoisie

in sustaining both

colonial rule as well providing the logic for the new nation-state that replaced that rule.
At its most fundamental level, the logic that animates colonialism – a violent process of
extraction, dispossession and displacement that Marx defined as the primary
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accumulation that gives rise to capital – continues mostly unchanged under the
postcolonial state, not just in India but in most of the postcolonial world . Whether the
national bourgeoisie plays the role of transferring wealth to a neo-colonial elite still based
in the colonial metropole, or uses the wealth generated by the surpluses of primary
accumulation to reproduce itself has been one of the long-running debates for Indian
communists and Marxists for most of the twentieth century and continues to appear in the
programmatic deliberations of Indian communist parties (Kaviraj 1988, 2010). However,
the distinction is largely immaterial from the perspective of the majority of the
population, who Chatterjee calls the ‘governed’, and who form the object of this
extractive logic (Chatterjee 2004).
The national bourgeoisie thus has a different relationship to the state it leads from
the majority of the people who are the objects of the violence that accompanied what
used to be colonial extraction and is now carried out under the auspices of the ideology of
‘development’. These continuities are also at the heart of Chakrabarty’s understanding of
‘Europe’ as not just restricted to a geographic sense but as part of an ideological and
ontological framework that is present in the very logic of modernity itself (Chakrabarty
2000). This is certainly true when understood as metaphor for the peculiar rationality that
produced colonial modernity and continues to give life to the social and political forces
driving postcolonial states, and thus much of the world. In a world that depends on a
fundamental level on a system of nation-states engendered by colonialism, Chakrabarty’s
Europe is seen to be located in the colonies that it created and which continue as
contemporary nation-states.
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However, we can also see that it is not just in a metaphorical sense that Europe is
located in the colony. Much of the structures and institutions of modern capitalism owe
their existence to the long period of colonialism and its ideological frameworks. These
include the moral ideologies of work and productivity, wage-labor and the corporation. In
addition to the wealth generated through colonial extraction that made possible the
European enlightenment, the modern urban environment, the institutions of civil society
and the reorganization of metropolitan society along the uniform lines of a secular civic
rationality, it was also the need to justify the contradiction between enlightenment at
home and barbarity abroad that the idea of Europe itself and the modern identity of a
Christian European was constructed. These ideas and structures are still the foundation of
much of what we take for granted in our contemporary world, including notions of
individuality and self-hood, and identities produced through race, gender, religion, caste,
language and nationality. The symbiotic link between colonialism and capitalism has now
been transformed into a new relationship between capital and the postcolonial élite that
replaced the colonizers. The racial difference that was produced by the colonial state to
justify the contradictions inherent in colonial rule by an enlightened elite has given to
differences based on identities of other kinds, such as of religion, caste and ethnic origins,
all of which are identities created by colonial rule itself (Dirks 2001).
The idea of a difference between a secular, rational European polity consisting of
a civil society and a state and the non-European world of primordial identities is thus part
of this same contradiction of a society based in civic virtues that depends for its existence
on the barbarity of the violence it unleashes on its Other. Without this constitutive
difference, the logic that makes possible the rule of an élite bourgeoisie over much of the
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world’s population would not be possible, both empirically and discursively. The effort
of the Subaltern Studies historians was to trace this difference in order to draw a truer
picture of the colonized world. The efforts of Indian political theorists are also directed at
the exploration of this difference and at the delineation of a theoretical framework that
explains this difference rather than becoming part of the discourse that produces the
difference in the first place.
Taking Chakrabarty’s notion of a ‘provincial Europe’ further, one can argue that
the contradictions embodied today within the polities of the nation-states of Europe and
the neo-colonial powers such as the United States and other settler colonies are thus
attenuated versions of the violent contradictions inherent to the postcolonial world. In the
United States, the most extreme of these cases, political discourse is now largely a mass
media phenomenon, commoditized as a media spectacle. However, I argue, following
Chatterjee, that this is merely a less pronounced version of the political discourse in India
which actually exists in two different realms altogether, a small civil society discourse of
politics based on European metropolitan logic, and a vast set of political practices that is
part of a domain of the governmental control of non-civil populations and that is absent
from media discourse of politics altogether. While all societies depend on the existence of
an excess, a population that does not belong to properly constituted civil society, in order
to constitute themselves and define themselves, this ‘population’ constitutes a minority of
the people in the metropolitan world and is seen as the exception that supports the rule;
while it is actually the majority of the people in the postcolonial world. Thus, an
exploration of the media discourses of politics in the postcolonial world has the potential
to offer us a new language to theorize the trajectory of both politics and the media in the
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European world as well. The difference between the two is one of degree rather than of
kind.

IV. Media Research in India
The above concerns motivate the attempts in these chapters to generate a
theoretical understanding of mass media in the postcolonial world that actually
corresponds to the reality of the postcolonial condition, a condition defined by a
fundamental political contradiction, between civil society on the one hand and the
actually existing politics that takes place outside it on the other. Unfortunately the
pioneering work of Indian political theorists in understanding and explaining the
postcolonial condition have found their way into few intellectual formulations in the
loosely defined discipline of mass communication and media studies. Much of this
influence has been felt in film theory and cinema studies that has looked at the popular
culture and public culture in the context of these political contradictions (Prasad 1998,
Srinivas 2013, Rajadhyaksha 2003, 2009, Vasudevan 2000, 2001, 2010, Mazumdar 2007,
Gopalan 2008), but also Rajagopal’s work on television and politics (Rajagopal 2001).
While there has also been work on visual and public cultures in general (Jain 2007, Roy
2007, Mazzarella 2003, Fernandes 2006), it is not explicitly linked to this tradition of
scholarship in political theory or historiography.
The absence of a critical theory of media that is grounded in the reality of the
postcolonial political condition is all the more untenable when we analyze the importance
of the mass media image to Gramsci’s own theorization of fascism, whose concepts have
provided such fertile ground for both Subaltern Studies and for other schools of thought
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that attempt to understand the operation of power in the modern world (Landy, 2008). In
contrast to this ‘Gramscian turn’ in modern Indian historiography and political theory, the
study of mass media, especially television has proceeded largely in the well-worn path of
American behaviorist research, focused on audiences, texts and political economy
(Mankekar 1999, Thussu 2007). This research takes for granted an equivalence between
societies and polities, especially the relations between members of society, and between
individuals, civil society and the state.
The history of mass media in the territories that are now part of the Indian
republic is intimately interwoven with the trajectory of colonialism. European trading
colonies were established in the subcontinent since the early seventeenth century. In
parallel to their development in Europe, print-based media grew in the colonial port cities
as the Mughal state was slowly dismantled and the British emerged as the pre-eminent
colonial power, starting in the middle of the eighteenth century. As in Europe, print
capitalism was the origin of modern mass media in India, and the outsize role the English
language plays in the perception of media influence in the country can be traced to these
origins as sources of mercantile and political information for British traders.
As in Europe, print media were primarily instruments for capitalist information,
and the public sphere they engendered as a result was inevitably biased towards the needs
and sympathies of colonial capital, based as it was on extraction and primary
accumulation. The spread of English education and the creation of a new Indian elite
schooled in European enlightenment values gathered pace following the Indian uprising
of 1857, as political control of the Indian territories passed from the Board of the British
East India Company into the hands of the British government. This new elite, expected to
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smoothen the spread of the logic of capital into all aspects of social life soon became the
nucleus of a movement demanding the transfer of power into native Indian hands. The
much quoted text from ‘Macaulay’s minute’, a policy document from 1835 attributed to
Thomas Babington Macaulay, a colonial administrator sets out the vision for this new
class that was to be created:
“It is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We
must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions
whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions,
in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the
country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature,
and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the
population”. (Macaulay 2003, Evans 2002)

The nationalists, as they began to organize in the late nineteenth century, created
new political print based media to advance the nationalist cause. Nationalist newspapers,
however, differed only politically from the European owned press, not in the fundamental
logic of newspapers as agents of information for capital. The rise of native capitalists, and
the spread of printing technologies also led to changes in the scripts and conventions of
native languages and the creation of new literary and journalistic forms (Jeffrey 1997).
The development of radio as a means of mass communication however occurred
in an age when the government was seeking to control information to guard against a
rising sentiment of nationalism and self-rule. Radio, for its inception, was understood as
an instrument of government, and this legacy also determined the policies of the Indian
government after independence towards both radio, as well as television when television
broadcasts were begun as an experiment in 1959 (Gupta, N. 1998, Butcher 2003, Kumar
2006).
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Indian mass media research came into its own as primarily policy-based research
for these initial experiments with television. As an American import, the methods for
studying its nature, impact and influence were also borrowed from current social science
research in the United States. This early research , such as the studies of the Satellite
Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) in the 1960s understood television to fulfill
primarily a pedagogic role, of training rural Indians to raise themselves and join the urban
elites in constructing a civil society of rational individuals. It was thus a tool of calling
into being a citizen-subject, who would mirror the ideal citizen who alone had legitimate
claim upon all the benefits the new nation-state would bestow: an educated, rational
individual, engaged in productive and gainful employment, such as in modern heavy
industry, specialized medicine, law and bureaucracy if urban, or as a modern farmer
utilizing the industrial chemicals and heavy machinery to generate vast surpluses in the
imagined rural hinterland.
This discourse imagined India as the space of an eternal middle class, perfect and
self-contained (Prakash 1999, Gupta, A. 1998, Roy 2007). The generic and unmarked
members of this class served to specify those who were indeed marked and then included:
regional particularities served to construct the non-Hindi-speaker as a lesser citizen,
marks of dress and language constructed the Muslim, Christian and Sikh as a separate (to
varying degrees) but equal form of citizen, and the clear delineation of the social roles of
men and women was enunciated through differences of dress and behavior. The striking
absence of the vast differences of caste served only to emphasize the caste identity of the
unmarked citizen, thus coding this ideal citizen subject as a Hindu male, upper-caste,
middle-class Hindi-speaking from a northern city or village.

	
  

16

	
  

The neoliberal restructuring of the Indian economy in the late 1980s led to a
limited form of commercial television within the state-led framework. However, the rise
of satellite broadcasters in the early1990s soon made state control of television moot.
Initially heavily dependent on popular cinema, the only form of privately produced
audiovisual entertainment then available, the new satellite channels soon began to
commission their own programming (Kumar 2006, Mehta 2008). Freed from their
dependence on the state however, they followed the same path as their print forebears
two hundred years ago: they were mainly carriers of capitalist information in the form of
advertising, and the programming was suitably structured to enable this logic to succeed.
To a large extent, research on television has also followed the same trajectory as
before: as models of successful commercial television, Indian research also followed the
dominant television research paradigm in the United States: concentrated heavily on
audiences, texts and political economy of production and consumption. Focused on the
relationship between the television text and its creator or spectator, it neglected its role in
social relations that already exist and its role in the political structures that sustain these
relations and are in turn sustained by them.
The exceptions to these studies have been works that acknowledge the
specifically political role that television plays, and sought to analyze its location within
political discourse. Rajagopal’s research on the role played by the new genre of Hindu
mythology as a television text in the rise of Hindu nationalism and its associated violence
is one instance of this, and its idea of a ‘split public’ is one that I will revisit in
subsequent chapters. In most other research however, television is merely an incidental
medium that is used only to instantiate a larger trend, without a problematization of the
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medium and its location. This is in stark contrast to recent studies of Indian cinema,
which has seen numerous works that have attempted to re-theorize its role in political and
cultural discourse, its generic conventions and referentiality and its relationship to
political economy and the construction of identity and subjectivity. Madhava Prasad’s
work on the Hindi film is one instance of this approach to theory, and his notion of
relating the trajectory of cinematic discourse in the Hindi film to the Marxist notion of
subsumption by capital (Prasad 2001) is one that can be considered a metaphor for the
larger predicament of the public sphere in India, formally influenced by capitalist
modernity, but not fully belonging to it.
The relationship of cinema to politics is another area where Indian film theory has
generated a large amount of theoretical reflection, primarily owing to the study of
political movements in South India that were led by charismatic actors and others
associated with the film industry. The intimate relationship between popular Southern
cinema and political parties, and political subjectivity in general has been dealt with in
great detail by many Indian scholars (Srinivas 2009, 2013, Pandian 1992, Prasad 2001,
Dickey 2007).
The nature and role of the mass media, especially television, constitutes my main
set of problems. Television is representative of mass media discourses in general while
having its own logic and aesthetics. As an offspring of radio and cinema, its aesthetics in
India borrow from both, and it exhibits the tension of the contradictions of state control
and being responsive to hegemonic ideals of ‘development’ on the one hand while
remaining driven by a commercial market logic on the other. A textual understanding of
this tension is also crucial to generating a theoretical understanding of the medium, but
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though Chapter 4 does engage with a representative set of discursive constructions in
news narratives, a detailed textual critique of television per se is outside the scope of this
work.
I use the words ‘mass media’ to include television, print media and other mass
communication technologies. While it is undeniable that each medium has its specificities
of technology, aesthetics and formal conventions, my concern in this work is with the
relationship of these forms with the practice and discourse of politics. In this sense, I
would contend that the media are actually consumed as a whole, as a source of
ideological narratives and structures, and not in isolation from each other. In other words,
my concern in this work is with the structural and functional logic of the media as such,
not with the technological differences which provide the specificities of each form.
Despite this, however, it must be acknowledged that Indian television as a cultural
form has had few theorized explanations of its role in the nation-state’s discourse and
structures. We have already seen that the cinema has a well developed set of critical
engagements and theoretical bases, and the Indian press, the other vast and complex set
of mass media institutions, has also seen a variety of critical engagement from scholars,
primarily in terms of media history, public culture and the history of nationalism. While
newspapers as a medium have increased in circulation and reach, with the spread of
literacy initiatives and the growing ease of reporting and publication, their influence on
public culture and political discourse is slowly being replaced by television news and
web-based news networks. The ‘liveness’ of television has also changed the expectations
of the role of mass media within political discourse, with the sound-bite, the immediate
reaction of political rivals and media statements tied to the prime time and 24-hour TV
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news cycle taking precedence over the earlier primacy of the morning newspaper’s
printing schedule. The rapid growth and maturing market of satellite broadcasting and
private news channels, while still unable to match the reach of the state’s terrestrial
broadcasting network, has added to this doctrine of the news as an immediate, live
discourse available on demand at any time of the day or night.
Television in the contemporary West can be understood as a medium that enables
the politics of metropolitan societies, in the sense that all legitimate politics is conducted
on and through television. In other words, the name ‘politics’ is now reserved for the
discourse that appears as part of the televisual flow. However, in postcolonial polities
such as India, this subsumption of politics by television is not complete or perfect. In
Marxist terms, we can consider this an instance of merely formal subsumption, where
politics is defined by television, but is not -yet- contained by it. The excess that the
uncontained and uncontainable politics represents is the focus of my attempt to construct
a theoretical framework for Indian television that is founded in political theory.
Television is thus a medium that is essential to political discourse, yet little
researched. It is now pervasive in Indian public life and discourse, yet sees little critical
engagement as a medium per se, as opposed to the attention paid to its content. This is
partly due to the complexity of the medium in terms of language: while the English
language television channels lay some claim to a national identity and an influential role
in national politics, their reach in terms of audience is minuscule and they address a
thinly spread elite across the major metropolitan centers. The Hindi language channels,
while commanding a large audience share are primarily based in the provincial
‘heartland’ of the northern states (the densely populated northern plains of the Ganges
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river system). The strengthening of India’s federal structures has also meant that different
Hindi channels now cater to different states and provincial and regional identities within
the northern regions, with only a handful providing a ‘national’, i.e., a New-Delhi centric
perspective of politics. Since the majority of India’s population speaks languages other
than Hindi, the growth of television in these regional or ‘vernacular’ languages has
followed the existing trajectory of the development of cinema, press and public culture in
these language domains, such that there now exist vast public spheres of Bengali, Oriya,
Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Marathi, Kannada, Punjabi and Gujarati television, while
lesser languages such as tribal dialects and the non-dominant versions of Hindi have seen
lesser growth, generally as offshoots of the dominant media houses.
All of this implies that there is no single ‘public sphere’ in Indian television, but a
multitude of spheres, interacting not with each other but mainly with a putative national
public to varying degrees. An analysis of all of these together is an exhaustive exercise
outside the scope of this work, while the analysis of the national sphere, while possible,
will not serve much purpose outside the delineation of a small elite discursive entity. For
this reason, my work focuses on the theoretical basis for these public spheres and
discourses, rather than the discourses themselves.
Gramsci’s passive revolution has occupied an important position in the discourse
of Indian political theory. Part of the reason is the similarity between the coalition of
classes that allowed the rise of fascism through coercion and consent in Italy, and the
processes that marked the formation of the postcolonial Indian state and its construction
as an instrument of hegemonic class forces. I argue in subsequent chapters that this
passive revolution, by creating the population as an object of the actions of the dominant
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class interests of the time, also created the divided nation-state that exists today and that
is at the heart of any potential theoretical understanding of the state, civil society, and by
extension the structures and institutions collectively called mass media. The contradiction
engendered by this division is also the focus of my own attempt at arriving at a
theoretical clarification regarding the media.

V. A Summary of the Present Work
I have tried to lay the ground for my motivation in attempting an exercise in
theory formation. The brief discussion in the preceding pages about the trajectories of the
postcolonial state in India and of the mass media, especially television, since
independence is clearly not an exhaustive account of either. A nation-building project on
such a vast continental scale that India’s élites began is clearly a complex and
multifaceted subject, and there continue to be multiple scholarly exercises from diverse
perspectives that try to capture its historical essence. However, the discussion in this
chapter should be sufficient to create a schematic understanding necessary for the
arguments that follow.
The following chapter of this work engages with the idea of the ‘split public’, a
concept that can be traced in or teased out from almost all scholarly work on Indian mass
media. I borrow the phrase from Arvind Rajagopal’s seminal work on the relation
between the televising of religious myths in the late 1980s and the rise of right-wing
nationalist political forces in the following decades (Rajagopal 2001), but try to elaborate
on its possible meanings and conceptual origins. I also posit that this is merely a
conceptual reflection of what Partha Chatterjee has theorized as the division between
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civil and political society as a characteristic feature of politics in India (Chatterjee 1998,
2004). I argue for the primacy of this concept as a prerequisite for any understanding of
non-Western mass media. The second half of this chapter deals with the obverse of this
relation between political theory and mass media: I argue that by understanding the
media as a location or ground of politics, and not just as a set of structures or institutions,
enables us to further problematize the ideological function of mass media in postcolonial
polities.
The subsequent chapter invokes Jean Baudrillard’s usage of the concept of the
‘semiotic’ as a heuristic explanation for civil society in a postcolonial state and its
relationship with mass media. I discuss Baudrillard’s theoretical treatment of the mass
media, his understanding of communication as symbolic exchange and of contemporary
media discourse as a process of semiosis. I draw on his concepts as a way to deepen the
preceding discussion of politics through the medium of television and to illuminate my
arguments about the divided national society that we find in Chatterjee’s framework. I
discuss Marx’s notion of the distinction between formal and real subsumption as yet
another way to understand this division between Baudrillard’s symbolic and semiotic
realms, where we find politics being differentially subsumed by the mass media,
representing the same logic as capital in its subsumption of labor. I also briefly discuss
both the wide-ranging intellectual roots of Baudrillard’s concepts in the work of Marx,
Durkheim, Mauss and Bataille, among others; and also the cultural context to his larger
theoretical framework of simulation and simulacra within which his theories of the media
are situated.
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In the fourth chapter I extend both Chatterjee’s concept of a political society and
Baudrillard’s notion of the symbolic to formulate a new understanding of the postcolonial
nation as a simulation. I argue for an understanding of the nation as a mediatized – or
semiotic – construction and the citizen as one element of this mediatization. I explore this
new understanding in the empirical terms of the absence of specific narratives around
identity, subjectivity and privilege in order to foreground the actual mechanics of this
process of mediatization or semiosis. I focus on three particular instances of this absence
as a means of illustration: the reportage of protests against the construction of an oil
refinery and industrial complex in Eastern India, the differentiation of a semiotic
‘national’ political discourse around corruption from the symbolic politics of a provincial
mass movement for autonomy, and the privileging of dominant markers of identity
through the criminalization of Muslim political discourse as ‘hate speech’.
The fifth and final chapter is my attempt at understanding the possibilities for
resistance to the processes of mediatization and the recovery of the symbolic. I reinterpret Chatterjee’s concept of the political society as a reflection of the symbolic
exchange still co-existing with the semiotic domain of civil society, seeing it not just as
the ‘politics of the governed’, but as a potential site of resistance to the hegemonic logic
of civil society. I also deal with the radical possibilities present in Baudrillard’s ‘refusal
to respond’ as a means of recovering communication from the semiotic and restoring the
process of symbolic exchange. I conclude with a discussion of what this would mean for
existing struggles against the hegemonic logic of the nation-state and civil society in the
post-colony.	
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CHAPTER 2
CIVIL AND POLITICAL SOCIETY IN A MEDIATIZED CONTEXT

I. The ‘Split-Public’ Sphere as a Sign of the Postcolonial
One of the most common threads of argument running through every description
of public cultures in India, including television and other mass media forms, is that of the
indeterminacy of a specific national public. While this might seem commonplace in terms
of problematizing any theorization of cultures anywhere in the world, it takes on a unique
position in India which is emblematic of the country’s origins in coloniality and its
aftermath. This position is that of a ‘split public’, or of a public sphere riven by a
fundamental contradiction that is obvious in even a cursory examination of its discourses.
Rajagopal uses the term in his discussion of the relationship between the Indian public
sphere and political mobilization:
“I use the term split public as a heuristic in thinking about an incompletely modern polity,
standing for the relationship between the configuration of political society desired by modernizing
elites and its actual historical forms. Central to this split is the unfulfilled mission of secularism in
a society where a compromise between Hindu orthodoxy and progressive nationalism launched an
anti-colonial independence movement, one that culminated in the declaration of a secular state.
The distinction between an officially maintained secular public sphere and a more heterogeneous
popular culture was not likely to survive the proliferation of new electronic media, however, as the
boundary-piercing character of television ensured the blurring of programming genres. Sure
enough, political parties themselves began to invoke the authority of faith to reinforce their
diminishing electoral credibility, while citizens drew on the narrative resources of religion to make
sense of an often disorientingly unstable polity.” (Rajagopal 2001, p.152)

However, this contradiction – of having separate sets of cultural spheres that are
united and made mutually intelligible only through the mechanisms of the nation-state –
is not just restricted to its public culture. It is a mark of its polity as well, and has been
exhaustively theorized by several Indian political philosophers from diverse perspectives.
In this chapter, while I argue for the importance of theorizing mass media through the
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lens of this contradiction, it is necessary to begin with a brief survey that traces this
contradiction through Indian political theory, history and media studies.
As a postcolonial society and polity, India is a country formed, not just in the
aftermath of the colonial encounter but because of it. The post in post-colonial has been
argued to represent this causality rather than a temporal progression from one state to the
other. The process of colonization and the experiences of the colonized peoples and states
cannot of course be reduced to a single experience or narrative: it varies widely across
what is now the Global South, and it even occurred in a diverse variety of forms in the
Indian subcontinent itself. However, what can be understood as a common link through
all these experiences, which gives the word ‘colonialism’ its contemporary meaning and
force, is the violent introduction of modes of European capital and ideological narratives
to displace a diversity of modes of being and thinking across the world. This violent
encounter is at the root of contemporary capitalism, law, governmentality and thus the
modern nation-state and the condition of modernity itself. The violence of the encounter
was a result not just of the extractive logic of capital, or of conflicting modes of thought
and being, but of the European urge, especially in the latter phase of colonial expansion,
to reconstruct the defeated societies and polities in a state of mimicry or simulation of
Western European forms. This process is at the heart of the ‘lack’ that came to define the
colonized, which Dipesh Chakrabarty underscores in his project of ‘provincializing’
Europe. The colonized were now to be seen only as eternally struggling to match the state
of existence of their colonial masters, never being able to achieve that state by definition.
This process of the production of the ‘native’ was also essential to constructing a selfimage and identity for the European as well. There was no Europe in the modern sense
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before its colonies, even as there was no white man before the construction of the
colonized non-white subject.
“There is, then, this double bind through which the subject of ‘Indian’ history articulates itself. On
the one hand, it is both the subject and the object of modernity, because it stands for an assumed
unity called the ‘Indian people’ that is always split into two—a modernizing elite and a yet-to-be
modernized peasantry. As a split subject, however, it speaks from within a metanarrative that
celebrates the nation-state; and of this metanarrative the theoretical subject can only be a hyperreal
‘Europe’, a Europe constructed by the tales that both imperialism and nationalism have told the
colonized. The mode of self-representation that the ‘Indian’ can adopt here is what Homi Bhabha
has justly called ‘mimetic’. Indian history, even in the most dedicated socialist or nationalist
hands, remains a mimicry of a certain ‘modern’ subject of ‘European’ history and is bound to
represent a sad figure of lack and failure. The transition narrative will always remain ‘grievously
incomplete’.” (Chakrabarty 2000, p.40)

This drive to construct a divided society, fundamentally and eternally fated to
exist as separate and distinctly unequal entities, lay behind the creation of colonial cities
and built environments, following the destruction of older urban and rural spaces. The
imagining of a colonial order of living, more European than Europe itself, led to the
simulation of a European public sphere, along with its attendant and requisite physical
and cultural paraphernalia: newspapers and communicative technologies, courts of law
and government, universities, social clubs, corporations of cities and capitalists, and a
panoply of political and social organizations that are deemed necessary to mark the
establishment of a functioning public sphere, ruled by the latest artifices and techniques
of the recent European enlightenment.
“If ‘political modernity’ was to be a bounded and definable phenomenon, it was not unreasonable
to use its definition as a measuring rod for social progress. Within this thought, it could always be
said with reason that some people were less modern than others, and that the former needed a
period of preparation and waiting before they could be recognized as full participants in political
modernity. But this was precisely the argument of the colonizer—the ‘not yet’ to which the
colonized nationalist opposed his or her ‘now’. The achievement of political modernity in the third
world could only take place through a contradictory relationship to European social and political
thought. It is true that nationalist elites often rehearsed to their own subaltern classes—and still do
if and when the political structures permit—the stagist theory of history on which European ideas
of political modernity were based. However, there were two necessary developments in nationalist
struggles that would produce at least a practical, if not theoretical, rejection of any stagist,
historicist distinctions between the premodern or the nonmodern and the modern. One was the
nationalist elite’s own rejection of the ‘waiting-room’ version of history when faced with the
Europeans’ use of it as a justification for denial of ‘self- government’ to the colonized. The other
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was the twentieth-century phenomenon of the peasant as full participant in the political life of the
nation (that is, first in the nationalist movement and then as a citizen of the independent nation),
long before he or she could be formally educated into the doctrinal or conceptual aspects of
citizenship.” (Chakrabarty 2000, p.9)

II. The Transfer of Power as a Sign of the Postcolonial.
In India, this process, in terms of political change, can be dated precisely to the
transfer of control of the British territories from the ownership of the East India Company
into the hands of the British crown, following the defeat of a military uprising in 1857.
The rapid military successes of that uprising in its early phases and the unexpected
coalescing of Indian provincial rulers under the banner of the titular Mughal emperor
surprised the Company, who may have seen in it the incipience of an Indian nation
founded on a revival of the pre-British polity. The barbaric reprisal against the leaders of
the uprising was followed by the immediate dismantling of the remnants of the Mughal
state, the exile of the emperor and his court, the dissolution of the Company, the
installation of the British monarch as the new empress of India and the creation of a
‘Government of India’ to oversee further colonial expansion and the maintenance of
colonial rule.
This rapid succession of political events was, on an ideological level, also the
culmination of a process set in motion early in the nineteenth century, to create, in
Macaulay’s words, a new class of people ‘Indian in blood but English in spirit and
outlook’ who would act as intermediaries between the vast subject population brought
into being by modes of capitalist extraction on the one hand, and the new government
based in the colonial port cities of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay on the other. As the
Mughal empire and its structures of government were slowly decimated over the course
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of a century from 1757 onwards, the inauguration of this passive revolution that created
in a stroke new classes of people, in the form of both a simulated native aristocracy and a
native bourgeoisie, required new institutions and apparatuses to function: these came into
being in the form of new universities in the three colonial capitals and the creation of an
education system premised on this foundational split between rulers and ruled, between
an urban bourgeoisie in the colonial port cities and an undifferentiated population in the
hinterland.
Colonial India can thus be understood as a place of simulation above all: of a vast
simulacrum of European social and political life built on the ruins and detritus of the old
society. This simulation found its apogee in the orientalist fantasy of the ‘Delhi Durbar’
of 1911, when the British king-emperor and his consort came to India to acknowledge the
allegiance of their Indian provincial allies. This show of pomp was intended to be a
recreation of Mughal imperial ceremonies, but ended up as an exhibition-like simulation
of an idealized Indian empire. The construction of a vast new imperial capital outside the
old walled city of Delhi that began soon after was intended to literally cast this fantasy in
stone (Legg 2007).
Today, this city of New Delhi is a remarkable emblem of this simulacrum: a
bombastic city of superhuman scale, a showpiece of the colonial empire intended only as
a space for Europeans and their collaborators, and divided into sectors for the government
and military administration and shopping arcades, public squares, plazas and parks for its
citizenry whose Indian members comprised members of the aristocracy, the haute
bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. Apart from discreet servants’ quarters, the majority of
its original inhabitants were expected to live in the ruined Mughal city to its north or the
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many villages that surrounded the new capital and that were now dispossessed of their
farmland and pastures by this gargantuan simulacrum.
The maintenance of this simulation required the miserable subjugation of an
entire population through a combination of legal, governmental and military means.
While racist at its core, it required the willing servitude and cooperation of the newly
anglicized non-white bourgeoisie and aristocratic class, who served in the enormous new
bureaucracies, founded industries and trading concerns, and participated in the rituals of
civic life modeled on a European pattern. It is this class that can be called the kernel of a
new civil society in India. However, unlike in Europe, this civil society did not share a
straightforward relationship with the state on the one hand and the family on the other.
From its inception, and by necessity, it consisted only of a very small minority of
anglicized Indians, and it depended for its existence on the state’s forced oppression of
the majority of the Indian population. This population, which did not belong to any civil
society whatsoever, was still the putative ‘people’ in whose name both state and civil
society sought justification for their existence.
The relationship of the state to the members of civil society was of a dual nature:
racist hostility of a white state to a non-white civil society that was coupled with the
mutual understanding of a state and civil society both founded on a shared European
logic of social life. The relation between the state and the majority of the population on
the other hand was one of unmitigated oppression: outright military control in the early
years giving way to systems of governmental control through legal and bureaucratic
means (Chatterjee 1998, 2004).
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It is this state of affairs that saw the rise of nationalist discourse in Indian civil
society in the late nineteenth century. Initially focused on providing a measure of
autonomy and self-government for the Indian subjects of the colonial provinces, Indian
nationalism in its early years was one of anglicized Indians raising the issue through the
institutions of civil society in the form of petitions, legal representations, journalism,
legislative processes, the public sphere engendered by print capitalism, and the formation
of political organizations to press for their demands. One such organization, the Indian
National Congress, was soon transformed in the early twentieth century into a mass
cadre-based organization that used protests, civil disobedience, demonstrations, rallies
and mass agitation to press their demands with the colonial government.
Far from erasing the gap between an elite civil society and the subject population
however, the élite Indian leadership of the Congress only amplified it, by calling into
being a nationalist struggle that was a response to the colonial government coded in the
very same discourse of that government. This was civil society taken to its extreme end,
to the stage of mass revolution that the bourgeoisie had earlier reached in Europe and
which had been replicated in various ways in their other colonies. However, the Indian
revolution was one without a revolutionary subject, a revolt without an insurrection. This
passive revolution, where power passed peacefully from white to non-white, from a
colonial British civic élite to their counterparts in Indian civil society, preserved intact all
the structures and institutions of colonial government including the oppression of the
majority of its population and the fiction of a civil society that maintained it (Kaviraj
2010).
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In order to achieve this simulated revolution, the nationalist élite also had to erase
from view any question that interfered with their definition of the new Indian nation as
consisting of a rational enlightenment-descended public sphere that would represent the
masses of people. One instance of this erasure was the resolution of the ‘women’s
question’ through the creation of a patriarchal private sphere outside the scope of civil
society, replicating the division of society under colonial rule still further (Chatterjee,
1993). It is these aspects of the nationalist movement that allow Chatterjee to call it a
derivative discourse, a discourse steeped in the logic of the very structure it was
ostensibly in conflict with (Chatterjee 1986).
The transfer of power in 1947 and the adoption of a new republican constitution
in 1950 changed the demographic nature of the relations between state and civil society.
Both were now inhabited by the same group of people and the new postcolonial state
came into being with the same kind of violence, war and mass killing that accompanied
the existence of the original colonial state. The new Indian state had also lost a large part
of its territory in its east and west and a large proportion of its Muslim inhabitants to the
new state of Pakistan. At the same time it had invaded and occupied the independent
states of Hyderabad and Kashmir and deposed their governments to incorporate them into
the new republic (Muralidharan 2014). However this bloody new beginning did nothing
to erase the fundamental control of the majority of the population by a civil society based
élite. The maintenance of the new fiction of representative government engendered not
only new forms of governmental control and coercion, but also the necessity of
hegemonic discourse and the consent of the governed. These new forms gave rise to all
the new developments in Indian polity that we can see today. It is these forms that
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Chatterjee labels the ‘politics of the governed’, and he defines this set of structures and
institutions that enable this politics as ‘political society’ in the Indian context (Chatterjee
2004, 2011).
Chatterjee’s conceptual understanding of the postcolonial state is borne out by the
experience of the immediate aftermath of the transfer of power: the decades of what are
now termed the Nehruvian consensus: the maintenance of the state as a benevolent,
technocratic, welfare-oriented authority which is inhabited by a coalition of landed
gentry, industrialists, intellectual élites and a bureaucratic-managerial class, speaking on
behalf of the mass of the people and wielding its coercive power in the interests of
general welfare. This power was manifested in a continuation of the colonial policy of
dispossession and displacement, but this was now done in the name of the interests of the
‘nation’, which demanded large dams, factories, mines and mechanized agriculture in the
rural hinterland and the concomitant migration and sprawl in the cities. The ‘steel frame’
of the colonial bureaucracy and the massive standing army of the erstwhile state
remained intact through the transfer, and were even enhanced under the new
dispensation. The new government also moved into the vacated colonial capital in New
Delhi, later enhanced with even more monumental administrative buildings in its vast
open spaces as if in fulfillment of its governmental destiny.
The nation, in the nineteenth century sense popularized by Renan, Gellner and
others, depended on a unified volk, speaking one language, following one confessional
tradition and with a shared body of ritual and tradition. While this was not true of Europe
nation-states in the nineteenth century, this was certainly not true of India in the
twentieth. The creation of the nation however depended on the construction of a citizen,
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and one was suitably constructed by the Nehruvian consensus: a rational subject, a
member of civil society in the public realm, shorn of the primordial markers of
confession, caste and clan affiliations, yet also inhabiting a private realm of patriarchal
authority where the traditional identities still held sway. This double faced citizen was
true to the nationalists’ own version of themselves and was the result of the passive
revolution that created and sustained the Indian state (Chatterjee 1993, Kaviraj 2010).

III. Civil Society as a Domain of Coloniality
Benedict Anderson has discussed the constitution of the nation as an imagined
community by the technologies of print capitalism (Anderson 1991). The Indian nation is
certainly true to this definition but only if the ‘nation’ is restricted to the civil society that
is recognized as the legitimate citizenry, if the nation is understood to comprise the small
minority of people who are educated in its mores, who share a common culture because
of access to mass mediated discourses of nationalism. It is not true to Anderson’s
definition if we are to include the majority of Indian people, who appear not as citizens
recognized by the nation, but as populations governed by the state. This distinction will
be clarified if we dig deeper into Chatterjee’s understanding of civil society, political
society and the state.
Civil Society as a concept has a long history. It is not my intention here to trace its
long and complex historical trajectory which has been amply done elsewhere (Kaviraj
and Khilnani 2001). In its early usage it was synonymous with both the state and with
polis, politics in general, and was in contrast to the realm of the family or the oikos, the
household. This concept, is complicated by Hegel’s definition of the term, drawn from
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Locke and Montesquieu where he posits civil society as an autonomous domain, between
the family and the state: distinct from both yet connected to them in myriad ways (Jones
2001, Chatterjee 1998). It is this Hegelian concept which Marx uses to locate the realm of
capital and its new revolutionary class the bourgeoisie, whose domain the civil society is,
and in which it thrives against both the ancient privileges of the state, and the private life
of the family. It is also this Hegelian concept that Chatterjee invokes to complicate the
trajectory of the postcolonial state and contemporary politics in India. At the same time,
Chatterjee’s categories also draw on Ranajit Guha’s influential early framework of
subaltern consciousness as representing the unique condition of ‘dominance without
hegemony’ (Guha 1997).
Chatterjee’s civil society is the autonomous realm of citizens who are recognized
as such by the state. The citizens engage with the state through the institutions of civil
society, such as parliament, the legislatures and the local deliberative bodies, the courts,
the universities, social clubs and professional associations and the variety of
organizations, groups, political parties, sports teams and local bodies that are rooted in
the notion of a European public sphere. In this sense, they share the common attributes of
a freedom of entry and exit, an independence from communal and primordial identities
such as caste, tribe and religion, and an autonomy from both the state and the traditions
governing the private life of the household. This civil society consists of theoretically free
and equal members who are related to each other and to the state through the ties of
bourgeois citizenship. They are fellow citizens of the same nation and can relate to other
national citizens on an equal plane. The state to them is the embodiment of the nation in
the form of a modern nation-state. This is the nation-state created through the nationalist
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movement against British rule, and the members of civil society can recognize
themselves as the descendants of the self-same nationalists of that movement.
Chatterjee defines modernity as the animating logic of this postcolonial civil
society. Modernity can also be understood as coterminous with both capitalism and
colonialism. The age we define as modern is coeval with the development of both within
Europe and in the rest of the world. The ideological structures of capital as we understand
them today, in terms of corporations, labor, managerial ideologies, the organization of
labor and society are the product of the colonial companies set up to trade in the
seventeenth century. Colonialism is the movement engendered through this trade and the
ideological justification for the exploitation inherent to it. Modernity, understood as the
new age of the bourgeois nation-state in Europe is the product of colonial capital. In the
rest of the world, modernity is synonymous with the advent of European colonialism and
capitalism and the consequent destruction of the pre-colonial world system. Since this
civil society in India is the result of colonization and the remaining embodiment of the
colonial encounter, it is appropriate to understand its driving force as the drive towards
modernity. Civil society’s role vis-à-vis the nation state is also understood by itself as
being the site of the discourse of ‘development’, another synonym for the discourses of
modernity in the postcolonial world.
“In the case of the formerly colonial countries of Asia and Africa, the dominant approach is to
apply the same yardstick of the abstract model of the modern nation-state and place the different,
actually existing states on a scale of ‘development’ or ‘modernization’. The overwhelming theme
is one of lack, sometimes with an additional story that describes the recent decay of a moderately
satisfactory albeit inadequate set of institutions.” (Chatterjee 1998, p.66)

Writing in the tradition of Indian political theory, Chatterjee’s interventions have
to be understood in the context of a political theory that, in the western sense, would have
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stopped there in terms of an ontology. However, Chatterjee defines this civil society to be
a very small ruling élite of the Indian nation-state. If political theory were to be
concerned merely with the domain of this civil society, it would be rendered meaningless.
The vast majority of the inhabitants of India are not part of this civil society and thus are
not really citizens in the same sense as the members of civil society are. This is not to say
they are not engaged with the state, but that their engagement is qualitatively different
from that of the legitimate citizens. In this majority, Chatterjee includes the small
peasantry, unorganized and informal labor, the homeless, squatters, street vendors, and
the bulk of Indians who fall outside the legal and civic structures of the nation-state. This
majority, which Chatterjee calls the ‘governed’, form part of a population or populations
that the state acts upon in its form as the government. It is the politics of the governed
that Chatterjee defines as being the true subject of Indian political theory, since this is the
actualized realm of Indian democracy, where Indian politics is located. Chatterjee calls
this realm ‘political society’.
“The major instrumental form here in the postcolonial period is that of the developmental state,
which seeks to relate to different sections of the population through the governmental function of
welfare. Correspondingly, if we have to give a name to the major form of mobilization by which
political society (parties, movements, nonparty political formations) tries to channel and order
popular demands on the developmental state, we should call it democracy. The institutional forms
of this emergent political society are still unclear. Just as there is a continuing attempt to order
these institutions in the prescribed forms of liberal civil society, there is probably an even stronger
tendency to strive for what are perceived to be democratic rights and entitlements by violating
those institutional norms.” (Chatterjee 1998, p.64)

This split polity is an emblematic feature of colonialism and is still present in
India in its present form because Indian colonialism and its anticolonial struggle were
both forms of a passive revolution engineered upon a population by a governmental state.
However, the crucial feature that complicates matters is that the postcolonial Indian élite
chose to construct the state as a democracy with universal franchise. The maintenance of
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the small élite of civil society was thus made dependent on the active consent of its
political society through a franchise renewed every five years. It is this contradiction in
Indian society that makes the postcolonial state unique and gives it its character. Any
scholarly or intellectual engagement with Indian society that does not recognize this
duality at its foundation and engage with it cannot accomplish a meaningful
understanding of its subject.
While critics of Chatterjee’s typologies have taken issue with its perceived crudity
or over-simplification of political and social categories (Gudavarthy 2012, 2013) , it is
important to understand that these terms, civil and political society, are intended not as
empirical descriptors of groups or individuals but as heuristic devices to understand
processes and structures that constitute the polity in India. To be sure, an individual can
be part of both civil and political society in different contexts, and an institution such as
parliament or a court of law or a university can be located simultaneously in civil society
as well as political society. For instance, parliament and the provincial legislatures are
frequently the site of bargains, transactions and negotiations that are not part of their
official existence but depend on allegiances and networks of kinship, caste, clan,
linguistic and regional affiliations. This aspect runs parallel to their existence as robust
deliberative bodies of elected members that exist in a world of Westminster-style
parliamentary procedure. Similarly courts of law sometimes function as arbiters of justice
that is negotiated through traditional kinship groups and communities while still
maintaining the fiction of operating within a common legal code: at other times the
courts are indeed the site of legal contestations between parties within a common law
framework, existing within civil society. Similarly a university may function as an
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education institution indistinguishable from its European origins, but may also be the
location of fierce political contestation on the basis of identities such as caste, clan or
religion. Seen in this sense, as a device to make sense of these contradictions and
dualities, Chatterjee’s typologies are useful and inherently true to the complexities of
Indian politics and civic life.
In his own work Chatterjee provides instances of street vendors and hawkers
negotiating space to do business with the agents of the state, or of slum residents
negotiating the provision of municipal services to their settlements (Chatterjee 2004). In
these instance, Chatterjee says that law cannot provide for these extra-legal contingencies
and the usual political domain of civil society cannot accommodate these people or their
demands. They have to be conducted in another domain, that of political society, directly
between the state and the population, without and outside the scope of, the domain of
civil society. At the same time, the animating logic behind the state’s willingness to
occupy this space of political society is that of democracy, since the population, while not
citizens, are still voters and therefore political actors, and in this sense more powerful
than citizens. But, because these transactions occur within the realm of political society,
they do not officially exist: the vendors are never legally entitled to their space of work,
and the slum residents are never legal owners of their houses or rightful recipients of the
state’s services. Since they are not rights-bearing citizens of civil society, they exist in a
space of contingency, that depends for its existence only on the tenuous foundations of
democracy.
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IV. Media in/as Civil Society
Understood as a form of simulation, colonialism takes on a new meaning as a
location for mass media discourses. This simulation exists in the institutions that
comprise colonial civil society. One of these institutions is the media which create the
conditions for a civil society in the first place. The public sphere seen as essential to a
civil society is sustained by the mass media, by newspapers and print publications
comprising part of the various discursive structures that make up colonial government.
Television entered this space as part of the postcolonial passive revolution in
1959. Controlled by the state until the 1990s, it was the medium through which the state
presented itself as the nation. Several studies of the state monopoly on television since
then have emphasized the propagandistic character of television in India (Kumar 2006,
Mehta 2008, Butcher 2003). However, since economic liberalization in the 1990s and the
concurrent development of satellite broadcasting that was free of territorial limitations,
the state has been forced to cede control of the airwaves to private capital. Currently,
India has a vast number of private satellite broadcasters, may of them broadcasting news
channels 24 hours a day. This has led to a rise in the demand of news as a commodity,
since it now has to feed empty airtime that is of a magnitude more than was available to
terrestrial broadcasting, but also to the sheer number of channels in every Indian
language. The majority of news channels in all languages are owned and operated by
particular political parties or by corporations and individuals allied to one. (Ninan 2007,
Kohli-Khandekar 2006, Thussu 2007). This makes the consumption of one or other news
channel not simply a way to consume the news itself, but as a way of allying with
political organizations through the act of identification with the appropriate media house:

	
  

40

	
  

it is thus an act of consuming politics itself as commodity, and of seeking to construct
and define ones ideological identity through such an act of consumption.
Private news channels have also proliferated in the entertainment sector, largely
resulting in a visually and thematically similar serial entertainment format modeled on
the American soap-opera. (Munshi 2009, Gokulsing 2004). Both these genres of
broadcasting however are not that different from each other, since the majority of what
they do is not merely reportage or scripted entertainment, but the active and constant
construction of the nation and its attendant contents: the citizen-subjects who inhabit it.
Consuming television is thus an act of consuming politics in a context where
politics is only ever a commodity. Political acts increasingly come to be performed on
primetime news and conversely, primetime news itself seeks its own raison d’être in the
active staging and exhibition of such performances. The liveness of news television lends
itself well to such a commodification and performance.
Within news channels, there exists a fundamental gap between the English
channels, which keep the semblance of being unaffiliated to a political party per se, and
the Indian language channels which, tied as they are to a local and grounded political
context, do not and cannot make such an assertion, but in fact are de facto political and
partisan entities in order to remain relevant in the political context of their locations.
Politics in India today is thus definable in two ways: the grounded activity that takes
place in neighborhoods, town and village squares, government offices, streets and rallies
on the one hand, and the discursive activity that is consumed as part of the 24 hour news.
(Rajagopal 2001). To be sure, these are not discrete entities or domains: on the contrary,
both clearly inform each other and sometimes exist in conjunction in multiple locations.
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However, the activity on the ground, Chatterjee’s political society in action, is an
autonomous realm, that will of necessity continue to exist regardless of its existence in
the days primetime news. The discourse on the news networks on the other hand exists in
its own realm, a play of signifiers in a closed loop, with its terms of reference clearly
located within Chatterjee’s civil society. This distinction gives us an opportunity to
precisely understand the nature, location and role of news television, and media discourse
in general, in India today.
The main blind spot in Indian political theory is the lack of an understanding of
the material location of politics as discourse. In this sense, the mass media, especially
television can serve as the ground on which the practice of politics is staged. Television
in India can be understood as the location of politics as practice, as well as an institution
that is part of political discourse.
The fundamental defining feature of postcolonial societies is thus this split nature
of its public sphere. This has been part of the commonplace of political theory as well as
studies of public culture and the public sphere. While Chatterjee’s political society
captures this division with precision, the autonomist Marxist idea of the multitude (Hardt
and Negri 2004, Virno 2004) also corresponds to the same notion of a population that has
to be dealt with by a state, as does Foucault’s notion of governmentality as the defining
characteristic of modern technologies of rule (Chatterjee 1998). The notion of the
existence of two polities within a shared territorial sovereignty is also hinted at but not
explored in almost all popular conceptions of Indian politics and society which
understands the division between the two as between rural and urban India, or between an
anglicized elite and a vernacular subaltern population. However, all such conceptions
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understand this division as further evidence of a lack, as Chakrabarty’s work says, on the
part of the subaltern, while the élite is seen as representing the fully developed eventual
destiny of the majority of the population. This is of a piece with orthodox Marxist
versions of capitalist and national development which sees the nation state passing
through several ‘stages’ of capitalist development, with the primary accumulation
characteristic of the subaltern domain being the ‘primitive’ starting point of capital that
will eventually evolve into the organized mass-manufacture that characterizes bourgeois
civil society and the eventual higher-order, non-manufacturing, service industries of the
modern West. The persistence of primary accumulation with the highest stages of
contemporary capitalism within the same sovereign territory, and the same society and
state, leads to a questioning of these stages of capitalism, but still attempts to portray the
realm of primary accumulation as a lack, or as a less developed version of the advanced
domains of capital within that state. However, Chatterjee’s analysis makes it clear that
both realms necessarily coexist, and depend on each other. Higher-order organized
capital and the civil society it engenders depend on the surplus of violent primary
accumulation for their existence.
The domain of primary accumulation can also be understood as the domain that is
not yet fully integrated into the formal organization of capitalism. Unlike the West, where
capitalism depended on primary accumulation in the colonies in order to build more
advanced forms of surplus distribution and generation at home that were divorced from
the bloody and violent conditions of actual extraction, advanced capital in India has to
exist in the same territorial realm as its more overtly exploitative version.
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In this sense, society in India can be understood as being subsumed into capital to
different degrees. Civil society would be that domain of society that is entirely part of the
organized capitalist world, existing in a global continuum with its national counterparts in
other parts of the world, while political society is part of capital only partially. This is
comparable to Marx’s understanding of the formal subsumption of labor under capital in
its early stages, as opposed to its real subsumption under advanced capitalism (Marx
1977).
Political society thus maintains a link both to the world before capitalism and to a
world without it, while civil society is entirely part of the capitalist structures. Political
society can be understood as maintaining a relationship to the lived reality of the majority
of the people, as providing a location for the ‘politics of the governed’, as opposed to the
idealized politics of the restricted (non-) public sphere that civil society represents.
It is in this sense that I argue for civil society as representing a form of simulation
of politics: a discourse of politics as it should ideally be practiced in a society of the
European model. The negotiated and messy material reality of quotidian politics as it
actually takes place is subsumed within the neat discursive sphere of an idealized polity
based on colonial laws and European reason; the democracy of political society is always
subsumed within the modernity represented by civil society discourses. It is the search for
the mechanics of this subsumption, the actual material location and site of this process
that drives my attempt to situate it within the space of interaction of mass media and the
domain of political activity. In other words, I argue that this subsumption, this process by
which the political activity as it exists is erased through its absorption into the idealized
logic of modernity represented by civil society, occurs through its mass-mediation,
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through its representation in media narratives. The absorption of the materiality of
political society into the narrative of civil society is therefore also the subsumption of
politics into mass media.
Anderson’s conception of the growth of print capitalism in Europe and the
consequent creation of nationalism through the virtual communities engendered through
the print media is continued today but through the visuality of television. The changes
wrought by television in terms of defining the idea of India to the people who live in its
territory are a discourse yet to be examined, and it is an examination beyond the scope of
the present work, but in so far as the nation exists solely in and as discourse for its
national subjects, that discourse is located in the visual narratives provided by television.
Whether this is in the form of news, advertising, entertainment or information is
unimportant: the unity of televisual form is more than the sum of the particularities of
generic differences. The discourse of the nation and citizen-subjectivity overcomes the
differences of genre of programming (and advertising), since the consumption is of the
cultural form of television itself, not of particular programs or commercial messages.
Given the extent to which the nation, in terms of form and discourse, is located
within television, and given the centrality of the discourse of the nation to the activity of
politics in both civil society and political society domains, it is surprising that the field of
political theory and philosophy is generally separate from the study of television and
other visual media. Television is now central to the understanding of politics in India,
both for its practitioners as well as for the public, and its importance cannot be ignored in
the field of political theory. At the same time, politics – in a broad sense of discourse
about the nation, state and society – is central to television as a cultural form. Any study
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of television content in terms of discourses or genres, whether of news, entertainment or
advertising, in terms of political economy of its institutions and structures, or in terms of
audiences, cannot exist in a field devoid of an understanding of the nation and its citizensubjects; in other words outside of the domain of political theory. Politics and television
are now so intertwined that any study of one must involve the other.
Scholars such as Couldry have warned of the dangers of the trap of mediacentrism in any understanding of the role of the media in social and political discourses
(Couldry 2004). Such a trap exists when one attempts to conflate the domain of the media
with that of politics as it exists. My intention here is to argue the opposite: that there is
indeed a conflation of politics and television, but this conflation is located in the domain
of civil society and this politics is the idealized discourse that necessarily has to be so
conflated , simply because it does not actually exist outside of television: this is politics
as televisual discourse. It exists only in television, particularly in television news.
Conversely, television understood as an institution, as an ideological apparatus exists
within this discursive realm of an idealized polity. They form a set of mutual referents, of
signifiers indicating only each other. However, I argue, following Chatterjee that this is
not politics as it actually exists in society, in most of the world: the ‘politics of the
governed’, the politics that is animated by democracy as opposed to modernity finds no
place in television, precisely because it belongs to a different domain, it does not fit into
the civil society discourse that television as a form has constructed for itself and in which
it is located; it is not part of the play of signifiers that comprises the politics of civil
society and television news. This domain, of actually existing politics is therefore a
domain that is always under erasure. This can be thought of as the domain of politics as
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speech, and it is equally ephemeral and cannot be written into the narrative of politics that
is authored by television news.
This cycle of signifiers referring to each other – a simulation of politics that
subsumes actual politics – is the crux of any understanding of political discourse and the
media in the postcolonial context. To elaborate and expand on this relationship and to
deepen this understanding of politics, I turn to the theorization of simulation and
signification of Jean Baudrillard, whose concepts of the simulation and simulacra and of
the semiotic and symbolic are useful in extending the ideal of the civil and political
society distinction into the realm of the mass media, where this division of politics is
ultimately located. Baudrillard’s concepts are essential to this project not just because of
their incisive insight into contemporary mass mediation, but because of their political
significance in terms of their distillation of a radical political tradition of understanding
society through signification.
In the following chapter I introduce Baudrillard’s theorization through its
antecedents in this tradition, including the critical elements of the later Marx, the radical
sociological tradition represented by Durkheim and the social anthropological tradition of
Mauss and its somewhat forgotten trajectory in the work of Bataille, the radical
communication theories of McLuhan, Debord and the autonomous Marxist tradition. I
argue in the following pages that it is this radical tradition in political theory of looking at
signification and mediation as an essential component of politics that make Baudrillard’s
work invaluable to my own.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SYMBOLIC AND SEMIOTIC DOMAINS IN THE POSTCOLONIAL
CONTEXT

I. The Intellectual Trajectory of Jean Baudrillard
Jean Baudrillard’s theory of the media is rooted in the notion of human
communication as a form and manifestation of symbolic exchange. In this, he borrows
from the tradition in social anthropology that studied non-western cultures and societies
to posit a non-capitalist mode of economic life centered on divestment rather than
accumulation. This was detailed in Marcel Mauss’ analysis of the Gift and the economic
structures it was a part of, that included the ‘potlatch’ as the culmination of the exchange
of symbols. Baudrillard also borrows from the tradition of radical economics of Georges
Bataille, the situationism of Guy Debord, the communication tradition represented by
Marshall McLuhan and Daniel Boorstin, and the autonomous Marxist tradition of
Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno, Gilbert Simondon and others to formulate an understanding
of human communication as a similar form of exchange of the symbolic.
Despite the diversity of theoretical antecedents for Baudrillard’s project, my
interest in his work derives from his status as an inheritor of radical Marxian thought that
attempts to move beyond the orthodox logic of Marxism that is stuck within a
productivity framework to a critique of political economy that attacks the consumer
society phase of contemporary capitalism. The study of mass media and the mediatized
society that we live in is part of his larger project of a society that has moved beyond
communication as symbolic exchange and now lives in the realm of pure semiosis, of a
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universe of signs signifying other signs. He calls this universe the ‘simulacrum’, a
reference to the philosophical concept of Plato’s cave where the shadow is mistaken for
the real. As William Merrin has pointed out however, the lack of understanding of
Baudrillard’s critical position among the anglophone academic world has led to a
confusing of his critical description of our world with a stereotyped notion of a
prescriptive postmodernism (Merrin 2005).
A brief excursus of Baudrillard’s broad range of scholarship will serve to
delineate the trajectory and antecedents of his thoughts on the media. In the critical
Marxist tradition, Baudrillard’s initial scholarship was in the footsteps of Barthes and
Lefebvre, as evidenced in his early work The System of Objects. He followed that with a
deeper critique of the shift in advanced capitalism in the western world from a focus on
the domain of production to the increasingly important problem of overproduction and
plenty, which had to be managed through the creation of a new domain of consumer
capitalism, which he engages with in The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures. Here,
influenced by the work of Herbert Marcuse, Georg Lukacs and the Frankfurt School, he
argues that the old Marxian critiques of alienated labor are no longer useful in a context
where all domains of human life – and not just work - have been commoditized and
brought under the domain of labor, such that alienation itself is total. His short following
work, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign takes this trajectory further to
add the concept of ‘sign value’ to the traditional Marxian concepts of use value and
exchange value of commodities. He argues that the increasing centrality of the sign value
of a commodity has led to the development of a new form of capitalism that orthodox
Marxian categories are no longer able to comprehend. His subsequent work takes this
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approach to its logical end, and turns into a criticism of actually existing Marxism that, as
he explains in The Mirror of Production, is merely the obverse, or mirror-image of
capital, since its critique is limited to the superficial effects of capital such as the
distribution of surplus or alienation of labor, without attacking the fundamental logic of
productivity and value that is responsible for its dominance. This leads, in his words, to
the failure of actually existing socialism which becomes in the end merely a more
efficient and equitable mode of the dissemination of capitalist logic in society, rather than
overthrowing that foundational logic itself. At this stage, Baudrillard’s critique of the
orthodox Marxian project locates him within a tradition of a critique of mainstream
liberal thought together with Georges Bataille’s critique of what he called the ‘restricted
economy’ of both liberal and Marxian economics in his work The Accursed Share, itself
influenced by Mauss’ work on the gift economy and potlatch, and Nietzsche’s work, On
the Genealogy of Morals.
Baudrillard’s subsequent work, Symbolic Exchange and Death, is probably his
most sustained adaptation of Bataille’s work to his own thought. Drawing from Bataille’s
theory of the general economy, Nietzschean critiques of the ‘slave morality’ of modern
society and Maussian anthropology among others, Baudrillard builds a theoretical
critique of a Marxism that is stuck in the critique of political economy and ends up as a
reformatory phase of capitalist logic. He contrasts this with the possibility of a radical
politics beyond Marxism, which can erase the productivity based logics of scarcity,
value, labor and a production-centric political economy, and replaces them with the
politics of excess, waste, destruction, festivity and pleasure and its ultimate valorization
of death in the form of sacrifice as embodying a fundamental critique of capital. He uses
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Bataille’s notion of ‘symbolic exchange’ to mean not just the pre-capitalist and noncapitalist modes of gift exchange, but also a new liberatory mode or domain of social
relations that has the potential to destabilize the existing relations between people that
have been commoditized and are hence restricted to notions of utility, rationality and
value.
The subsequent works Simulacra and Simulation and Fatal Strategies elaborate
on the concept of simulation itself and the notion of simulacra that he characterizes as the
defining feature of modern societies based on signification. In the Shadow of the Silent
Majorities takes his critique of the liberal emancipatory project further to argue that in a
world where political action itself has been commoditized, the majority of people have
been rendered ‘masses’ who are acted upon by mediatizing capital. However, instead of
the futile project of raising and spreading consciousness among these masses of their
status as an oppressed class or classes, Baudrillard proposes extending his ‘fatal
strategies’ of political action that are grounded in a radical passivity towards capital
rather than an active opposition. By consuming to excess, by taking the mediatization of
society and the commoditization of social relations to its extreme end, it is possible for
the masses to destabilize and destroy the logic of capital more thoroughly than through a
traditional call to arms founded on a symbolic subjectivity that no longer exists.
The idea of the consuming subject as an object produced by the mass media is the
main argument of The Ecstasy of Communication and The Transparency of Evil where
subjectivity has been replaced by the construction of humans as objects of capital, created
through the ideological apparatus of the mass media. The power of the mass media to
define history itself was demonstrated further in his essays on the first Gulf War of 1991,
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where he argued that the symbolic nature of the actual war was rendered immaterial by
the semiotic narrative that passed for the war on the television screen. As the first war to
be broadcast live on primetime news, the Gulf War became a televisual narrative even as
the actual bombs dropping in Iraq were rendered invisible through the hyper-visibility of
the semiotic narrative Eventually , he argues, the mediatization of the world leads to the
disappearance of the reality principle itself. As the semiotic narrative of signs referring to
other signs takes over, we are left with a world in the form of a simulacrum, a copy of our
world, and then a copy of the copy, but each more real than the last, such that reality now
refers to a fetishized set of features that he calls ‘hyper-reality’, which is more ‘real’ than
the symbolic representation of the reality that has been abandoned.
Baudrillard’s subsequent work is more derivative in nature, being the repetition of
his theoretical insights to his travels in the United States and around the world (America
and Cool Memories), apart from his increasingly abstract treatment of aspects of our
commoditized world in the realm of art and media. His later work is also concerned with
the meta-theoretical questions of the role of scholarship itself, such as in Impossible
Exchange, where he argues that theory itself is locked in a kind of potlatch with reality
that cannot end, and the way out is to look towards a kind of ‘pataphysics’ popularized by
the artist Alfred Jarry which replaces metaphysical thought by concerning itself with the
imaginary and the possibility of other realities. He sees this as the only way in which
theory can leap ahead of reality and anticipate it, rather than being locked in an endless
struggle of truth-claims and counter-claims.
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The last significant evocation of the concept of the potlatch to his theory occurs in
his short text The Spirit of Terrorism, which saw the attack by terrorists on the World
Trade Center in 2001 as a form of final gift, that could not be exchanged. He sees the
attacks as firmly located in modernity and as the inevitable conclusion of the escalation
of violence that the United States was engaged in for many decades. By giving the
ultimate gift of a spectacular violence through sacrifice to the United States, the terrorists
in Baudrillard’s view escalated the symbolic exchange of war to a point of no return,
since their gift cannot ever be matched by its recipients.
Despite this diversity of his oeuvre, Baudrillard’s work does exhibit a common
thread that runs through his thought and has evolved in different directions in his myriad
texts. This is the idea of the disappearance of the real and its replacement with a
simulacral universe as part of the progress of capitalism and modernity through the
world. Even his topical political writings, whether on the Cold War, the Gulf War or
terrorism, are mainly concerned with the inexorable spread of this simulacral logic of
capital to ever more areas of the world that were hitherto unincorporated. This
disappearance of the real is evidenced by the disappearance of its actual representation, in
the form of the symbolic, and its replacement by a new form of representation
masquerading as the real which he calls the semiotic. For the purposes of studying human
communication and the media, this distinction between the symbolic and semiotic and the
division of social relations between a disappearing domain of symbolic exchange and the
new realm of the semiotic are the essential concepts that I will elaborate further in the
following pages.
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II. The Real and the Simulacral: Symbolic and Semiotic Domains.
For Baudrillard, the ‘symbolic’ refers to an order of representation of reality that
is still close enough to the real to be recognized as a mere representation. It thus exists as
a field of signification where the sign consists of a signifier that points to a signified
embedded in a recognized reality. The symbolic cannot exist without reference to this
reality and depends on the recognition of the reality principle to fulfill its role as a system
of representation. Communication is thus part of the social relations characterized by
symbolic exchange, an affective process that is outside the commoditized domain of
social relations that are produced by capital. Baudrillard borrows the term and the idea
from Bataille’s references to social relations grounded in the exchange of gifts, where the
driving forces are of waste, generosity and divestment that are dictated by the spirit of
excess that is seen as natural to the human condition, rather than utilitarian forces based
on prudent accumulation and investment that are dictated by a scarcity-driven logic of
capital. As capital spreads its logic to ever more areas of human life and social relations
that were once beyond its control, Baudrillard says that more and more human
communication leaves the domain of symbolic exchange and enters the realm of the
semiotic, where the exchange is only one of signs referring to other signs, and loses the
representational connection to reality that symbolic exchange once engendered.
“The entire political sphere loses its specificity as soon as it enters the media's polling game, that
is to say, when it enters the integrated circuit of the question/answer. The electoral sphere is in any
case the first large-scale institution where social exchange is reduced to getting a response. Thanks
to these simplified signals, the electoral sphere is also the first institution to be universalised:
universal suffrage is the first of the mass-media. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, political and economic practice merge increasingly into the same type of discourse;
propaganda and publicity were fused, marketing and merchandising both objects and powerful
ideas. This linguistic convergence between the economic and the political is moreover what marks
a society such as ours, where 'political economy' has been fully realised. By the same token, it is
also its end, since the two spheres are abolished in another reality or media hyperreality. Here
again, each term is elevated to a higher power, that of third-order simulacra.” (Baudrillard 1993, p.
65).
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Baudrillard’s understanding of the contemporary mass media runs counter to the
mainstream notion of the media as a conduit for communication. He suggests that the
media are in fact an apparatus that actively prevents communication in the form of
symbolic exchange from taking place, and in fact are a means of non-communication,
since they belong to a domain of signification that is removed from the symbolic. This
domain is what he calls the ‘semiotic’, and he defines it as a system of signs that consist
of signifiers that only ever refer to other signs. This means they are a replacement of a
recognized reality rather than a representation of it.
“Thus the media are producers not of socialization, but of exactly the opposite, of the implosion of
the social in the masses. And this is only the macroscopic extension of the implosion of meaning
at the microscopic level of the sign. This implosion should be analyzed according to McLuhan's
formula, the medium is the message, the consequences of which have yet to be exhausted. That
means that all contents of meaning are absorbed in the only dominant form of the medium. Only
the medium can make an event - whatever the contents, whether they are conformist or subversive.
A serious problem for all counterinformation, pirate radios, antimedia, etc. But there is something
even more serious, which McLuhan himself did not see. Because beyond this neutralization of all
content, one could still expect to manipulate the medium in its form and to transform the real by
using the impact of the medium as form. If all the content is wiped out, there is perhaps still a
subversive, revolutionary use value of the medium as such”. (Baudrillard 2007, p. 102-103)

Following Baudrillard’s understanding of communication, it is possible to trace
the increasingly dominant role of the mass media in human communication as a means of
increasing their role in social relations as well, relations which are dependent on human
communication. The history of the media under capitalism for Baudrillard is thus the
story of the disappearance of the symbolic and its replacement with the semiotic. For
Baudrillard, the symbolic is not ‘reality’ as such, but a means of representing reality
which is meaningful and through which reality can be perceived and felt. The semiotic on
the other hand, by replacing the connection that humans have to an independent reality,
creates its own bubble, a closed loop of communication, where signs only ever refer to
other signs.
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In a mediatized society, all social relations exist through the technological
structures of the mass media. This includes the fundamental meta-social relations
represented by political actions and events. In a capitalist system, which Baudrillard sees
as inseparable from modernity, these relations are commoditized as well, and exist as
elements of a code that operates through the structures of the mass media. On a
superficial level, this can already be observed as a phenomenon in the politics of the
advanced capitalist countries, where ‘politics’ refers to a discourse located in mass media,
and the news, primarily through television, plays a vital role in creating and maintaining
this discourse. Relations between people and groups are also defined through the codes
constructed through mass media discourses. However, Baudrillard’s own reference to
semiosis is to a deeper structural process. In his essays n the Gulf War, he provides an
empirical instance of his theorization in terms of current political events. His critique of
the media is not directed at the purported falsity or ideological misleading that is usually
attributed to them, but to the transformation of society itself, such that it is not possible to
connect to a reality that does not exist within the media, at any level of experience. It is
thus a critique at a deeper level of media form, rather than at the level of media texts. In
today’s mediatized world, it is not possible for a human being to know in a meaningful
way the truth about the world, even a truth as stark as the sight and sound of bombs and
the destruction of populations, as long as such a truth does not exist in some form in the
mass media that the person consumes. The problem for Baudrillard is not the truth or
falsity of the media images and narratives, but that the very existence of those narratives
in our lives has rendered it impossible for us to know the world as it exists outside them.
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In other words, the semiosis represented by the media narratives has destroyed the
symbolic connection that we would otherwise have had with our own reality.
“Just as the psychical or the screen of the psyche transforms every illness into a symptom (there is
no organic illness which does not find its meaning elsewhere, in an interpretation of the ailment on
another level: all the symptoms pass through a sort of black box in which the psychic images are
jumbled and inverted, the illness becomes reversible, ungraspable, escaping any form of realistic
medicine), so war, when it has been turned into information, ceases to be a realistic war and
becomes a virtual war, in some way symptomatic. And just as everything psychical becomes the
object of interminable speculation, so everything which is turned into information becomes the
object of endless speculation, the site of total uncertainty. We are left with the symptomatic
reading on our screens of the effects of the war, or the effects of discourse about the war, or
completely speculative strategic evaluations which are analogous to those evaluations of opinion
provided by polls”. (Baudrillard 1995, p. 41).

The question of the media and of the simulacrum that the media represents is
therefore not simply a question of the technologies of mass communication, in terms of
the television or the internet, but of the transformation of our society by those
technologies. The privatization of social lives – whether in the increasing walling off of
social groups and communities from each other in cities and towns in the developed
world or the commoditization of social services and political action, the changing nature
of work, pleasure and life in general – can be considered a part of the evolution of the
simulacral society that the semiotic process represents and portends.
Baudrillard identifies the simulacrum with the most advanced phase of capital.
The commoditization of everything implies that everything now has a sign value, which
supersedes any use or exchange value it may have had. Since the problems of production
have been solved decades ago, capitalism cannot survive any longer on the surplus
generated through the use of labor power. Capitalism now enters a phase where the
generation of more and more consumption is necessitated in order to solve the problem of
excess, a necessity that leads to the primacy of the sign value of what is produced, since
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consumers no longer have any actual use for commodities, and exchange value by itself
no longer leads to the surpluses that sustain the continued multiplication of capital.
The commoditization of society implies the commoditization of politics as well.
In the West, politics can therefore no longer adequately generate a response to the
simulacrum since it has become part of it and become subsumed within it. The recovery
of the symbolic is the only way out of the endless loop of semiotic signification, but that
recovery is also no longer possible in the West. However, as I argue in the following
pages, Baudrillard’s idea of a society divided between symbolic and semiotic domains is
far more valuable and relevant as a description of the postcolonial condition alluded to in
the previous chapter, especially in terms of providing an actual location for Partha
Chatterjee’s theoretical devices of civil and political society.
“The dwindling of the political from a pure strategic arrangement to a system of representation,
then to the present scenario of neo-figuration, where the system continues under the same
manifold signs but where these no longer represent anything and no longer have their ‘equivalent’
in a ‘reality’ or a real social substance: there is no longer any political investiture because there is
no longer even any social referent of the classical kind (a people, a class, a proletariat, objective
conditions) to lend force to effective political signs. Quite simply, there is no longer any social
signified to give force to a political signifier”. (Baudrillard 2007, p. 47).

The reasons for this relevance of these epistemological categories to the
postcolonial world in general and to India in particular can be better understood if we
think of the difference between the West and the ‘rest’ in terms of their degree of what
Marx called ‘real subsumption’ under capital. A brief historicization of the concept of
subsumption is helpful in order to correspond Marx’s own very specific understanding of
this concept to the relation between capital and labor, with a broader meaning of the
encapsulation of social relations within the logic of capital.
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III. The Process of Subsumption
Marx refers to the relationship between labor and capital as passing through two
stages, at the end of which the pre-existing forms of labor, which are always prior to
capital, are transformed through a process of absorption within capital. In ‘The Direct
Process of Production’, an originally unpublished chapter of Capital, Marx labels this
process ‘subsumption’ and invokes it in the context of explaining the origins of the
distinction between absolute and relative surplus value. Subsumption, for Marx, is also a
way of drawing the relation between a capitalist universal and the particular represented
by pre-capitalist forms of labor. When the universal encounters the particular, it
subsumes it within itself, such that what was once an autonomous external particular is
now merely one instance of the universal logic of capital.
Marx sees this process of subsumption occur in two distinct phases. In the first
phase, capital encounters labor and subsumes it in order to generate surplus value. Marx
calls this absolute surplus value and says that labor is subsumed only to the extent that
this surplus value is generated by capital, and not any further. Thus labor retains its
particularity in other respects, but is implicated within capital only as far as the
generation of surplus value is concerned. Marx takes the example of the small peasant
farmer or the handicraft artisan to illustrate how capital uses their labor in order to
generate surplus value that can be appropriated, but where the actual form of labor itself,
whether small peasant agriculture or handcrafted artisanal production, is left untouched.
Marx calls this the ‘formal subsumption of labor under capital’.
“The labour process becomes the instrument of the valorisation process, of the process of capital’s
self-valorisation — the process of the creation of surplus value. The labour process is subsumed
under capital (it is capital’s own process) and the capitalist enters the process as its conductor, its
director; for him it is at the same time directly a process of the exploitation of alien labour. I call
this the formal subsumption of labour under capital. It is the general form of any capitalist
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production process; but at the same time it is a particular form alongside the developed mode of
production which is specifically capitalist because the second involves the first, but the first by no
means necessarily involves the second” (Marx 1977, p. 975)

However, the relentless drive of capital to constantly increase the amount of
surplus value that can be generated from its subsumption of the peasant’s or artisan’s
labor necessitates changes to the proportion of necessary labor that sustains the worker
and the labor that is used to generate a surplus for the capitalist. This brings Marx to the
notion of ‘relative surplus value’, that is made possible only if the form of labor itself is
changed, such that the primary goal of the activity of labor is no longer the growing of
crops per se, or the creation of a handicraft, but the generation of surplus itself. This leads
to a change in the process of labor itself, and is achieved through the destruction of any
pre-capitalist logic underlying production that does not treat surplus value-generation as
its primary objective. Marx calls this phase the ‘real subsumption of labor under capital’
and marks this phase as the actual triumph of capital over labor, since now labor is no
longer an instrumental means of generating surplus value, but becomes a fundamental
aspect of the reproduction of capital itself.
“This development of the productive power of socialised labour, as opposed to the more or less
isolated labour of the individual, etc., and, alongside it, the application of science, that general
product of social development, to the direct production process, has the appearance of a productive
power of capital, not of labour, or it only appears as a productive power of labour in so far as the
latter is identical with capital, and in any case it does not appear as the productive power either of
the individual worker or of the workers combined together in the production process. The
mystification which lies in the capital-relation in general is now much more developed than it was,
or could be, in the case of the merely formal subsumption of labour under capital. On the other
hand, the historical significance of capitalist production first emerges here in striking fashion (and
specifically), precisely through the transformation of the direct production process itself, and the
development of the social productive powers of labour…
Just as the production of absolute surplus value can be regarded as the material expression of the
formal subsumption of labour under capital, so the production of relative surplus value can be
regarded as that of the real subsumption of labour under capital”. (Marx 1977, p. 975)
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While Marx wrote about subsumption in terms of its relation to surplus value, it is
clear from his notes that he intends real subsumption to invoke something more than
merely the relation between capital and labor. The transition from formal to real
subsumption also marks a transformation of social relations in general, and is to be
understood as a phenomenon broader than merely a reference to the change from absolute
to relative surplus value.
“What is generally characteristic of formal subsumption remains valid in this case too, i.e. the
direct subordination to capital of the labour process, in whatever way the latter may be conducted
technologically. But on this basis there arises a mode of production — the capitalist mode of
production — which is specific technologically and in other ways, and transforms the real nature
of the labour process and its real conditions. Only when this enters the picture does the real
subsumption of labour under capital take place…
The real subsumption of labour under capital is developed in all the forms which develop relative,
as distinct from absolute, surplus value.
With the real subsumption of labour under capital there takes place a complete [and a constant,
continuous, and repeated a] revolution in the mode of production itself, in the productivity of
labour and in the relation between capitalist and worker”. (Marx 1977, p. 976)

The autonomous Marxist tradition in the 1970s saw in the idea of subsumption a
useful tool to explain the social changes in Western capitalism after the tumultuous years
of the 1960s. In their view, Marx’s idea was useful to speak about labor in the 1860s, but
in an age where the commodity form had replicated itself in every aspect of human life,
subsumption of labor now implied the subsumption of society itself under capital.
Antonio Negri, for instance saw the theory of surplus value as essentially the a theory of
exploitation (Negri 1991). While the domination of capitalist forces in modern society
had hitherto led to the formal subsumption of social relations within the logic of capital,
they held that post the 1960s, capital had reached a new phase that was more totalizing,
where all social relations were ‘capitalized’ in a sense, such that they only made sense
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any more within the narrow utilitarian logic of increasing surplus value. Society itself had
undergone a process of real subsumption under capital.
If we understand ‘social relations’ to imply human communication, this phase is
coterminous with the increasing mediatizing of communication such that it is clearly the
mass media that is the location for this process of real subsumption. The ‘media’ are thus
literally in the middle, in the sense that they represent the mediation of human
communication through the means of capital. This is real subsumption in the context of
communication, and the media can thus be understood as the location of this new
totalizing phase of capital.
If we reflect on the distinction between the trajectory of capital in the West and
the postcolonial world, the correspondence of Marx’s two-phase trajectory of capitalist
subsumption to the divided societies comprising the postcolonial nation-state becomes
clear. While Western societies are characterized by their real subsumption of human
communication under capital, a postcolonial country such as India is evidently a divided
entity in this respect: while certain domains of society are clearly implicated in capital
and subsumed within it, the majority of the country’s social relations are still outside
capital. This is not to imply that they are in some way untouched by the logic of capital,
otherwise known as modernity, but that their domination by capital is only partial, and
more specifically, formal. In India, therefore, while certain aspects of social life are fully
within the sphere of capital, many other aspects are still only formally subsumed. This
difference in the characteristics of subsumption of social relations under capital is the
same as the distinction that Chatterjee draws between a postcolonial civil society (that is
fully subsumed within the logic of capital, hence an instance of modernity), and a
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political society (that is only partially modern, and therefore reflects a location in social
relations that are not fully amenable to the colonial logic of modernity). This formally
subsumed domain can also be understood as analogous to the domain of subaltern
consciousness that the Subaltern historians attempted to invoke.

IV. Mapping the Simulacrum in the Postcolony
The line I am trying to trace here from Chatterjee’s description of the Indian
polity on the one hand to the explanation of human communication that Baudrillard
posits as his proposed theory of the media thus goes through the common ground of
capital and the concomitant discourse of modernity that unites them. Society in the West
is fully subsumed under capital: this also means that civil society in the West is a more
totalizing entity than that in India, since it encompasses the totality of social relations. In
this sense civil society emerges in a new definitional sense as the material manifestation
of capitalism in terms of the organization of social relations. Rather than the idealist
public sphere beloved of liberal political theory, or the autonomous domain free of state
and the household in the Hegelian sense, civil society has to be understood as the form in
which capital manifests itself in society, where it leaves the domain of mere production,
and enters into the totality of social relations, by absorbing into itself – subsuming – any
and all aspects of social relations that pre-date it and are therefore inimical to its driving
logic of generating value. Social relations that once signified human needs that were prior
to capital and unrelated to the creation of value are now mediated through the logical
prism of capital and emerge on the other side as referents to new needs within the
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capitalist system, and lose any connection to what existed before and may still exist
outside.
Civil society thus represents the arrival of modernity in the realm of human
relations, and it is no surprise that the foundations of our current understanding of civil
society as an autonomous public sphere lie in the rise and spread of print capitalism. Civil
society in this sense is another name for the mediatization of the organization of social
relations, for the absorption of an older system of human organization into the logic of
modernity, that is synonymous with the teleology of capital.
It is in this sense, I argue, that as a mediatized entity from its origins, civil society
is synonymous with what Baudrillard calls the semiotic. It is the domain of
communication that is autonomous precisely because it is self-referential. The classical
public sphere, as found in the work of Jürgen Habermas, that owes so much to this
idealistic view of civil society, depends on the existence of this domain only because of
its freedom from any association with the state. The state is still encumbered by the
exigencies of democracy, or the needs of its populations, while the public sphere exists in
a new, autonomous realm, free of such encumbrances, and contained within itself. Both
the public sphere, and the civil society that is its necessary condition, comprise an
autonomous universe of signifiers referring to signs located within itself, a true domain of
the semiotic, and a sign of the most advanced phase of capitalism, embodied in
Baudrillard’s notion of society as simulacrum. If we understand civil society in the
abstract in these terms, it will enable us to locate its material existence more specifically
in postcolonial societies and will allow us to make sense of Chatterjee’s heuristic
categories in a more grounded fashion.
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But what of the symbolic? Just as Baudrillard’s sees in the loss of the symbolic
the foundational loss of a pre-capitalist and potentially non-capitalist set of social
relations, it is the recovery of the symbolic that has the radical potential to destabilize
capitalist modernity and restore human communication to its original connection with a
lived reality. In this sense, the symbolic cannot be located within civil society, but always
outside it. The difference between the West and the postcolonial world in terms of the
symbolic is also just as acute: in the West, the symbolic has to be recovered or
rediscovered anew, because all of society is now subsumed under civil society, just as all
of the West’s social relations are now mediated through capitalist modernity. However, in
the rest of the world, Chatterjee’s ‘politics of the governed’, takes place outside the
domain of civil society, and the bulk of the population is thus not subsumed within the
semiotic domain that civil society represents. The symbolic is therefore a domain that can
be mapped onto the relations between people and the state that Chatterjee calls political
society. These are relations that are grounded in a material connection between the
population and the state, without the ideological mediation provided by the discourse of
civil society (such as that of citizenship, nationhood, law, reason, and so on). Of course,
what Chatterjee calls political society is as much a discursive set of relations as well, just
as the symbolic is as much a discourse of representation as the semiotic is; the difference
in both cases, is that it is a representational discursive construction at one remove from
reality, and which cannot exist by itself, but only as a way to mediate that reality that is
prior and independent of it. This is unlike the semiotic domain or the discourse of civil
society that is a domain unto itself, and refers only to itself.
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The question of political action in the ‘rest of the world’ is therefore a question,
not of recovering or recreating a lost domain of the symbolic in social relations as
Baudrillard suggests for the West, but rather the challenge of developing a new language
or idiom of politics that is located within the symbolic realm of political society that is
already not only extant but is also the dominant domain of politics in the non-West. To
elaborate, the challenge for politics in India, is that while actually existing politics, what
Chatterjee calls ‘democracy’, takes place in the material domain of political society,
outside the narratives of an élite civil society, it can only be spoken of in terms of its
discursive presence in civil society, or in other words in terms of its appearance in the
semiotic domain that Chatterjee says is represented by modernity.
To restate my earlier contestation about the distinction between colonizing and
colonized societies in Baudrillard’s terms, this disjuncture between an unspeakable
symbolic and a discursively dominant semiotic is for me the defining characteristic of
postcolonial politics. I argue that in material terms the location of this disjuncture is the
mass media, since that is where the discourse of politics (as opposed to politics itself) is
both produced as well as deliberately ruptured from its representation of reality. The mass
media is therefore a component of civil society in terms of function and structure, but it is
a unique component, since it is also the location where the ideological foundation of civil
society in the form of discourse is generated and where contemporary civil society is
itself located. In other words, if we consider, as I argue, that civil society in the
postcolonial world is nothing but a discursive construction, that it only ever exists in the
realm of discourse and has no material existence in actual politics, then it is the mass
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media that is the location of that discourse, and by extension the location where civil
society is to be found.
This brings me to the crux of my definition of the media in India and its
relationship to politics: the media is the repository of civil society and therefore the site
of its discursive realm of politics. No theorization of politics in India can ignore the
media simply because without it, the very discourse of politics would not exist. At the
same time, no theory of the media in India can exist outside the consideration of this
discourse of politics, because the media is but the manifestation of this discourse: any
attempt to theorize the media – whether as narrative, structure or institution – is bound to
be incomplete if it ignores the primary function of the media which is to provide a
location for the existence of the discourse of civil society. As an ideological apparatus,
the media thus play a very different role in the postcolonial context: instead of
representing a discursive reality that is dominant outside it, it creates a new discursive
reality that is unrelated to any dominant reality outside. Any theory of the media has to
account for this ideological role, a role that is present in the very form of the mass media,
irrespective of generic specificities of content such as news, entertainment or advertising.
The final chapter of this work elaborates further on the potential for political
action in the non-West in this scenario, where traditional political forms are subsumed
under the semiotic domain of civil society. Before that however, it will be useful to look
at certain specific instances of politics that take place in political society but are rendered
as intelligible events in civil society only through the discourse of news. The process of
subsumption that civil society engages in, wherein the politics of the majority of the
population is sought to be absorbed into the universal idiom of modernity represented by
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civil society can be clarified further through these instances. This idiom, I argue, is
represented primarily by the domination of the nation-form and its corollary, the
normative citizen-subject that is a prerequisite for modernity.
The next chapter therefore is a brief summary of three such instances of politics
within the domain of democracy, as Chatterjee calls the logic of political society, but
which lack a necessary idiom of theory to be successfully rendered as politics per se. In
this scenario, the ideological apparatus of civil society in the form of the mass media step
in to subsume these acts of politics into themselves, producing new narratives that are
part of the pre-existing semiotic system and which enables civil society to exist as a
discourse.
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CHAPTER 4
THE NATION-FORM AND THE ABSENT PRESENCE OF THE SYMBOLIC

I. The Nation-Form as a Simulacrum
The idea of the nation as a discursive construct rather than a concrete and material
entity is one that runs through all contemporary theorizations of the nation-form, from
Renan to Gellner to Anderson. Chatterjee himself, in an earlier work, distinguishes three
kinds of such discourses that enable the nation to exist (Chatterjee 1986). The nation as a
form, is of course a discourse that needs a constant narrativization so as to maintain its
ubiquity and normativity, as distinct from the modern state, which indeed exceeds the
realm of discourse, and exists in material terms in everyday life. The connection between
cultural forms and the nation has been the crux of all arguments about the nation as
discourse, and Anderson came closest to identifying the origins of the nation as
engendered through the practices of print capitalism, or perhaps more broadly, through a
particular mode of mass communication.
In my project, which is to construct a theorization of the mass media in the
postcolonial political context, an engagement with the form of the nation is crucial.
Understanding the relation between the nation and its media is important not just to locate
the discourse of the nation itself, but also to define the role, purpose and nature of the
mass media as institution, structure and a set of discourses. At the outset I posit that the
mass media exist in order to provide a location for the discourse called the nation to exist.
In other words, in so far as the nation has a discursive existence, distinct from the state, it
is located firmly in the texts produced through print and broadcast media, and their
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current extensions located on the internet as a distribution platform. This chapter is an
attempt to delineate this location with more precision in light of my argument that the
media are a part of both Chatterjee’s civil society in terms of the divided polity of a
postcolonial context, and a part of the domain of Baudrillard’s semiotic in terms of the
processes that define the divided public sphere in India.
In this chapter I instantiate this attempt at location with three examples that are
emblematic of how this discursive construction of the nation is actually materialized
through mediation, its relationship to the state (and the hyphenated nation-state that
subsequently emerges) and to modernity by way of capital. These instances are not a
form of textual analysis of the content of these discourses in an empirical sense, but an
attempt to cover the variety of ways in which this process of semiosis takes place and in
which this location is achieved. In this sense, these are instances at random and are part
of a continuum of media form, which I argue, following Raymond Williams, is itself the
essential element of the discourse, apart from any consideration of the specificities of
genre or content (Williams 1990). Marshall McLuhan’s much-quoted dictum about the
equivalence of the medium and the message is also another way of arguing the primacy
of the media form – which is always already the communicated message – over the
textual elements of the narrative content which are of secondary consideration, and which
are not particularly of import to my argument (McLuhan 1994).
Seen from the other side of the lens, i.e., from the standpoint of the nation-asdiscourse, one can also argue that political theory is itself impoverished by its neglect of
this essential characteristic of the nation: the nation-as-media discourse. In its emphasis
on institutions and structures of power, and the materiality of the processes that constitute
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the nation-state, political theory ignores the importance of the mediating processes and
the mass media structures in the very constitution of the discourse that it studies. By
treating the media as a either an ideological apparatus within an a priori state, or as part
of the restricted field of political discourse, it fails to acknowledge the actual location of
the nation-form in the contemporary world, a location that is necessitated by the
transformation of capital into a signifying process centered in the consumer society. In so
far as the nation is a product of capitalism and colonial modernity, the shift in capitalism
from the domain of production to one where consumption is the primary concern and the
primary source of surplus value has also transformed the location of the nation itself, into
a semiotic discourse in a consumer society. This chapter therefore is as much an attempt
to theorize the media in a postcolonial polity as is it is an attempt to open political theory
to the possibilities inherent in understanding political categories as inherently elements of
a mass-mediated discourse and thereby argue for a greater emphasis on the mediated
nature of the epistemological categories of politics.
The primary effect of the nation as media discourse that is of concern to my
argument is its consequent production of the category of the citizen, or rather of the
subjectivity of the citizen as a fundamental element of the nation-form. This citizensubject is always an idealized discursive element, whose very normativity is the most
important aspect of the banality and ubiquity of the nation as discourse. I approach the
location of the nation in mass media therefore through this rubric of the normative
citizen-subject. In quotidian terms, I argue, the discursive existence of this citizen-subject
is the way the population of a state experiences the discourse of the nation itself. In the
broad context of the meta-textual elements that make up the media form, as well as in the
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deeper sense through the actual textual elements, it is the citizen-subject that is at the
heart of the mediated discourse of the nation. An approach to the nation through the
means of the citizen-subject is thus the most material way in which we can engage with
the nature of this discourse.
Chatterjee’s assertion of the distinction between civil society and political society
also pivots on his definition of the relationship between the state and the people who
constitute these domains. While the majority of the people are treated as an
undifferentiated mass of population by the state and thus come to constitute political
society, the small élite that comprise civil society are the ones who occupy the exalted
position of citizens. The ‘citizen’ therefore refers to an actually existing group of people
who share certain common characteristics and a common relationship to the state because
of those characteristics, but who are nevertheless not the majority of people who
constitute politics. In this sense, the normative citizen, despite being a discursive
construction, is not quite an imaginary entity: the discourse is open to a certain group of
people who are enabled to occupy, embody and populate it. This group of people is of
course the membership of civil society and the citizen is therefore the embodiment of
civil society’s relationship to the state.
It is also helpful to remember the colonial origins of both the nation-form as well
as civil society in Europe: the free and open membership of civil society and the secular
nature of the new nations of Europe after the Reformation were a part of the emergence
of capital as a secular power in itself, and was also enabled through the primary
accumulation of natural resources in the colonies and the brutal savagery of the colonial
encounter. This aspect, the “darker side of modernity” (Mignolo 2011), and its originary
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advent “dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt” (Marx 1977) is
as true of capital as it is of its institutions of rule such as the nation and civil society. The
response of Napoleon Bonaparte to Toussaint L’Ouverture of Haiti is as much evidence
of these origins as are the relationship of the United States to the Atlantic slave trade and
the lofty parliamentary debates of Westminster to the deadly brutality of British rule in
India and much of the world. The common element underlying these historical events is
the exigencies of European capital and its search for resources and profits. In this sense,
in a global context, the European nation-form as well as its ideals of civil society were
always already a domain of the semiotic avant la lettre, with the colonized world falling
into the tragic shadowy realm of the symbolic. The only difference with the
contemporary context of postcolonial India is the absence of any relationship between
colonial political society of the time with the logic of popular democracy.
In postcolonial India, on the other hand, capital no longer has recourse to this
externalization of violence abroad that can sustain the idealized domain of civil society at
home. On a global level, there is of course still a quasi-colonial division of the non-West
into zones for resource extraction by capital that provides for the maintenance of civil
societies in the West, a phenomenon sometimes defined as neo-colonial or neoimperialist. However, this perspective obscures the situation in India where the existence
of a small European-style civil society in the colonial fashion goes together with the
existence of capital that depends on primary accumulation and the violent exploitation of
entire populations. The dynamics of this co-existence are what fuel my own concern with
the process of mass mediation, since I argue that it is the existence of the civil society as
media discourse that sustains this hitherto unparalleled situation of colonialism without a
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colonial power in the classical sense, what M.K. Gandhi called “English rule without the
Englishman.” (Chakrabarty 2000, p.34)
The constitution of the normative citizen occurs through the embodiment of
several aspects of this subjectivity. In India, they include the identity-based markers of
class, caste, religion, gender, race, language, regional origins, ethnicity and sexuality
among many others. The citizen therefore, as an element of civil society, is one who
occupies and embodies the most privileged and dominant aspects of these roles. These
roles are not just an outcome of majoritarian political discourse or the strength of
numbers, but the product of a specific history of privileges that originate in coloniality.
The colonial definition of normative and acceptable forms of identity, the enumeration of
populations based on these identities, the division of the population along these lines of
identity and the privileging of certain groups at the expense of others, whether based on
considerations of colonial politics or ideology, has led to the current set of ideal-typical
characteristics of the normative Indian citizen.
The postcolonial state has been unable to erase this history of coloniality in its
constitution of citizenship mainly because the postcolonial state itself is a product of the
nationalist struggle against colonial rule that was born out of these colonial privileges. In
its final phase, the nationalist movement was the movement for the transfer of state
power from the colonial government to a new class of citizen-subjects that was created by
colonialism and occupied the domain of civil society within which the nationalist
movement took place. The partition of the Indian empire into two nation-states based on
religious identity was also a factor behind the overtly Hindu religious identity that the
postcolonial Indian state acquired, along with the other ideological biases and practices of
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the colonial state that were transferred wholesale to the new state. This superficiality of
the Westminster system that was set up in the wake of this transfer of power is perhaps
what B.R.Ambedkar, who chaired the new republican constitution’s Drafting Committee
was referring to when he warned “Democracy in India is only a top dressing on an Indian
soil, which is essentially undemocratic”.
Like Baudrillard’s notion of the hyper-real, the new postcolonial state was, if
anything, more colonial than the colonial state it replaced. Despite its massive power and
force of arms, the colonial state was never able in its close to two centuries of conquest to
subdue entirely the remnants of pre-colonial political forms in the subcontinent. While
militarily subservient to the colonial state, these remnants survived in the form of over
five hundred principalities and kingdoms scattered as enclaves of widely various sizes,
and with varying degrees of autonomy, across the colonized territories. At a stroke, the
new postcolonial state negated the treaties that had enabled these incipient nations to
survive colonial rule, and incorporated them through military invasion into the new state,
erasing any alternative conception of modernity and political belonging that these ‘native
states’ may have represented. The totalizing nature of the postcolonial state with respect
to a hegemonic modernity was therefore far more awesome than that represented by its
predecessor.

II. The Simulacrum under Capital and its Symbolic Challenge
The extractive aspect of the postcolonial state is perhaps the most visible sign of
its continuity of colonialism through other means. This aspect has undergone a drastic
upsurge in importance since the neoliberal reforms of the Indian government in the late
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1980s and early 1990s allowed greater freedom to global capital to engage in primary
accumulation and create a consumer society within Indian civil society. In order to
overcome the lack of an external colony where the violence of resource extraction and its
consequent displacement and dispossession can be staged, the Indian state has continued
with the colonial practice of designating certain portions of its territory, that belong to the
symbolic realm and are thus not part of the semiotic domain of modernity, as acceptable
domains for externalizing the violence of primary accumulation. Many of these areas are
the lands inhabited by tribes that fall outside the state’s conception of the nation-form ad
the citizen subject. Some of these instances of accumulation by capital are in territories
which have seen the formation of guerrilla armies as a tribal response to the state’s
violence, in many ways replicating previous tribal resistance to the colonial state a
century ago (Guha 1999). Most of these are organized by the Communist Party of India
(Maoist) and are also remnants of older localized communist insurgencies against the
state from the 1940s, 1960s and the 1980s. One such instance, relevant only in its
currency rather than any other distinguishing feature is the opposition of the Dongria
Kondh tribe of the eastern state of Orissa to the mining of bauxite from a range of hills
where they live.
The hills, principally the peak Niyamgiri, are a considered a particularly rich
source of bauxite and are located in a fertile and water-rich area that is currently thickly
forested. While the peak itself occupies a sacred space in the Kondhs’ self-identity, their
opposition to its destruction and the consequent building of a massive aluminum plant to
process the mineral is premised on a deep understanding of the Bataillean ‘general
economy’ of the region: the bauxite in the bedrock is what gives the region its uniquely
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fertile soil through its superior absorption of rainwater and the regeneration of
underground aquifers that feed the numerous streams and rivers on which the Kondh
depend. The destruction of the hills and the depletion of their constitutive minerals will
therefore lead to the desertification of the forests: a process that will be hastened by the
massive quantities of fresh water that the aluminum plant will draw from the ground. The
corporation that has purchased the rights to the bauxite from the state is a Britishregistered but Indian-owned entity called Vedanta Resources plc. Vedanta itself has
grown into a transnational corporation only recently mainly through the cheap purchase
of formerly public state-owned mining companies in order to obtain access to their vast
territorial rights. It is therefore an excellent and overt instance of the relationship between
the postcolonial state and global capital. (Tokita-Tanabe and Tanabe, 2014).
Chatterjee’s description of the ways in which the state deals with the political
society (into which the Kondh tribes clearly fall) can be observed in the progressive
evolution of the issue of the opposition to the mining in the last few years. Faced with a
growing Maoist insurgency in the regions adjoining the mineral belt in Orissa, the state
responded to the massive increase of environmental destruction that has accompanied the
rise in primary accumulation since the 1990s through a series of progressive legislation
since 2004 that enables local elected bodies to have greater control over the exploitation
of resources in their territories. This has led to the village councils in Orissa being
empowered to vote on the permission given to Vedanta to displace them by mining in the
Niyamgiri hills. All villages located in the displacement zone unsurprisingly voted to ban
the company from mining in their territories.
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Here, while it appears that the tribe is now a part of the civil society discourse of
an elected council that can discuss and debate the issue, this is not how it appears in the
actually existing civil society embodied by the national news. Driven by the Leviathanlike discourse of ‘development’ which the nation-form sees as the embodiment of the
greater good, the modernity represented by heavy industry is seen as essential to the
making of an evolved nation-form, and to fulfill the destiny promised by the discourse of
civil society. The stubborn persistence of non-modern forms of life within he same
territorial boundaries as civil society creates a contradiction that did not exist in the age
of colonialism, when it could be explained as a form of resistance to colonialism rather
than to capitalism or modernity. The opposition to resource extraction and environmental
destruction is therefore seen not primarily as anti-modern or anti-capitalist, but as antinational. This leads to the construction of the Maoist guerrilla as a terrorist figure,
familiar from decades of anti-communist tropes about insurgency and the recent
discourses of terrorism. The opposition is therefore reconstructed as a sign of Maoist
agitation and incitement to violence of the otherwise simple and innocent savage that the
figure of the tribal represents in the narrative of the nation-form.
The opposition of the village councils to the mining permission given to Vedanta
has not stopped the company from constructing the aluminum plant itself, and from
recently applying for a permit to expand production facilities. The construction and
expansion occurred under quasi-military protection from the state and its local political
leadership. This may have the appearance of a legal contradiction, but it is clear from the
material progress of Vedanta’s work on the ground that the decision of the village
councils and the reality of the law that enabled that decision is itself in question. Thus,
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the tribes, while ostensibly allowed into the discourse of civil society, are in reality being
dealt with just as the state deals with other aspects of political society: as a population
that has to be somehow managed, whether through the coercive means of the state police
or through the consensual approach of an opportunity to speak to the state as a village
council. This dual approach can be seen in the reportage of a recent development in the
process of expanding production in the plant: as part of the law, Vedanta is now required
to submit to a public hearing where any member of the public can ostensibly speak and
voice their opinion abut the project. Again, this may appear as a sign of the penetration of
civil society discourse into the tribal heartland of India, and indeed it is reported in the
media in such terms. All the news agency reports, from Reuters and the Associated Press
to the Press Trust of India narrated a fictionalized account of a deliberative process that
seemed to have rationally debated the pros and cons of expanding production in the plant,
and democratically come to a consensus that permission should be granted1.
In reality, as video testimony from activists present showed, the hearing was a
semi-secret event, with a heavy presence of the police, local political leaders, bureaucrats
and Vedanta staff2. A group of people who are clearly not normative citizen-subjects (and
are therefore intended to be tribal, in order to provide the stamp of authenticity), hold a
set of neatly printed signs proclaiming support for the company, for development of their
region and the expansion of the plant. The first half of the hearing includes laudatory
speeches from the assembled dignitaries before a group of people walk in to protest the
hearing and demand to speak in opposition. Clearly not expecting this disruption to the
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See Chitrangada Choudhury’s report ‘What you've read about the recent Vedanta hearing was wrong’
http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantage/what-you-read-about-recent-vedanta-hearing-was-wrong
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script, the police and other staff try to stop the new entrants before being persuaded to
allow a representative to speak. While the tribal representatives speak of their opposition
to the mining and the plant and ask how the plant can function without the bauxite that
has now been theoretically denied to them, the entire hearing is abruptly brought to a halt
by the police and bureaucrats present even as it turns into a violent confrontation between
the tribe and the local leaders. News reports the next day make no mention of the
contested nature of the hearing, only neatly merging the hearing into a discourse of
democratic disagreement that led to consensus. Permission was granted to the plant to
expand, and its applications for permission clearly indicate it intends to continue with its
original plan of mining the Niyamgiri hills to make use of this expanded capacity.
Rather than the fundamental question in political society of the nature of
modernity and the role of the nation that is posed by the Kondhs’ opposition to the
mining and the aluminum plant, the issue in the domain of civil society becomes one of
managing pollution, legality and economic development. The semiotic nature of the civil
society and the media that it is located in only allows for a restricted set of signifiers
which have the language or means to connect to the domain of reality outside the
semiotic. The Kondh’s discourse of the sacredness of the mountain, of the freedom to live
in a different mode of modernity, of a relationship to the local rather than to the national
and of the undesirability of capitalist development are unable to find a place in the media
discourse because they exist as signifiers of real conditions, in a plane of symbolic
discourse, which the semiotic nature of civil society does not allow the mass media to
enter. At the same time, the state itself has to manage the Kondhs’ demands as that of a
population, given the competition that it faces from the proximity of Maoist guerrillas
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ready to take over its role, and has evolved several discursive means for this purpose
while reserving the right to use armed force in the last instance.

III. The Simulacral Center and its Provincial Symbolic
The primacy of the nation-form in civil society leads to the persistence of a
distinction between the ‘national’ media mainly in English and Hindi, and the ‘regional’
media in the vernacular languages of the non-Hindi states. Despite the existence of a
Hindi public sphere and civil society, of which the Hindi media is a part, it does not
occupy the same national space as English. As a continuation of colonial and nationalistera prejudices, the Hindi media is the national as imagined by the provincial public of the
northern hinterlands, while English, given its metropolitan provenance, enables the
English language media to become the public sphere of no one and nowhere in particular
and therefore of the nation in general. The Hindi media, therefore, despite claims to
national representation still speak to a resolutely provincial imagined audience and this is
reflected in their idiom and perspective, reflecting the needs and concerns of their north
Indian public, while the English media are in a sense purely semiotic, without the
qualifying need to be responsive to specific set of consumers and therefore it is in the
English language Indian media that we see the semiotic domain in its most advanced
form. This is seen in the way in which political events are represented and narrated, but it
can also be seen in which political events even become events in the first place. The
difference in visibility between two mass movements that came to a climactic head in the
period 2011-2013 exemplifies this choice that the semiotic has to make over the
definition of an event and its incorporation into the narrative of civil society.
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As a federal republic, the Indian state oversees twenty nine states, which owe
their current boundaries to a variety of factors. Some, such as the large northern states
were simply continuations of administrative units under colonial rule, while others such
as Bengal in the east and Punjab in the west are the rump territories of much larger subnational provinces that were partitioned to create the nation-state of Pakistan in 1947
(which itself split after a civil war to create Bangladesh in 1971). To a large extent, in the
majority of the country that does not speak Hindi, the states are reflections of linguistic
communities, where the Stalinist idea of ‘one language, one state’ was put into practice in
the years following independence.
The Linguistic Reorganization of States in 1956, redrew the existing provincial
boundaries to create new states whose only reason to exist was a shared language among
their respective populations. The first linguistic state to be so created was Andhra Pradesh
in 1956, created by merging two distinctly different Telugu-speaking regions, one that
included coastal districts from the colonial province of Madras, and the other that was
part of the native kingdom of Hyderabad. Since the creation of Andhra Pradesh, the
former citizens of the Hyderabad region had been agitating to reverse the merger and
create a new smaller state of Telangana. This grew into a popular movement after several
promises of regional autonomy went unmet in the decades that followed. It came to a
ahead in 2009 with massive street protests and a wave of popular demonstrations in the
city of Hyderabad led by university students and government employees, mainly from the
hitherto oppressed castes (Kannabiran et al 2010). As the city and many of the region’s
towns came to a standstill for months, the movement grew into a general strike and a
reaction against the neoliberal ideological framework that was the foundation of the
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regional inequalities of wealth in the state3. Since all of the local Telugu language media,
including newspapers and satellite television stations were owned by coastal-area
political leaders and prominent capitalists (who were usually the same group of people)
(Pingle 2010, Maringanti 2010), the leaders of the movement set up their own media
houses to counter the discursive construction of their protests as a problem of law and
order.
The dynamics of the media war in the Telangana movement and the relationship
between the new public spheres that were hereby created through this conflict is a
fascinating issue that deserves a deeper study and is outside the scope of the present
work. However, my concern here is the relationship between the national and the
provincial and the space the semiotic realm of the nation-form makes to accommodate
the symbolic struggle represented by such a popular movement. In sum, the relationship
was one of apathy, primarily because the issue at hand was not one that affected the civil
society that constitutes the English language media in any conceivable way. For several
months, except for brief mentions during particularly violent clashes, a political
movement that was raging for over two years in India’s fifth largest city and its
hinterland was almost entirely absent from the national media.
The provincial public sphere is therefore one that is entirely divorced from the
semiotic domain at the national level. However, this plays an insidious role in terms of
defining the identity of the participants in the struggle themselves, by marking their
concerns and issues as secondary in importance. This definition of what constitutes the
‘national’ is even more apparent when we consider that this period (2011-2012) also saw
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See ‘An extraordinary general strike for Telangana: A Suneetha, Vasudha Nagaraj and Others’ at
http://kafila.org/2011/09/28/an-extraordinary-general-strike-for-telangana-a-suneetha-vasudha-nagaraj-andothers
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massive street protests, and an upsurge of violent clashes in the Kashmir valley against
Indian occupation and in support of Kashmiri independence, another grassroots
movement which was also conspicuous by its absence. This erasure of the symbolic
through apathy is necessary to construct the discourses that are acceptable to the semiotic
domain, which becomes apparent when we consider next what the English language
media was actually reporting during these months.
In 2011 a septuagenarian social activist called Kisan Baburao ‘Anna’ Hazare and
his followers from the western state of Maharashtra came to Delhi as part of a movement
to demand an end to corruption (Jenkins 2014). As the leaders were mainly upper-caste
Hindus speaking in a Gandhian idiom, their movement was joined by various progressive
groups, non-governmental organizations, and generated sufficient media attention since it
was taking place during a particularly slow news period in the heart of the national
capital where many of the English language news channels are based. As the highly
conservative and reactionary nature of the movement’s leaders became apparent, they
were also joined by two highly successful Hindu religious preachers, who had made
fortunes through their yoga franchises and television appearances and were popular
among the aspiring middle classes. These gurus brought many of their congregations
with them and the media attention followed. When Anna Hazare was arrested and later
released, he decided to fast indefinitely to press his demands for an end to corruption,
which he did not define, but in his view would come about through the constitution of a
new ‘guardian council’ headed by a lokpal or ombudsman, who would be appointed by
eminent and morally sound people. As the media attention forced the parliament, also
based in Delhi, to debate this amendment to the constitution, Hazare and his motley
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collection of followers provided a ready-made 24/7 narrative for the television news
channels. Cameras were positioned all over the large square in Delhi where he had
pitched his marquee and the yoga gurus and other sundry religious figures, already
television stars in their own right, provided ample diversion to keep the cameras busy and
the sound-bites flowing. In a matter of days, this phenomenon had metamorphosed into a
national crisis as news anchors breathlessly compared the events to the then recent
protests that had been labeled the ‘Arab Spring’ and ominously foretold the end of Indian
politics and the crisis of the nation-state. Crews fanned out in other metropolitan cities to
chronicle a supposed national movement with reports that announced an impending
revolt of the middle classes that would cleanse the political system of its corruption, in
language that was thinly disguised as to its animosity both to the ‘deepening of
democracy’ that had seen the increasing participation of lower castes in electoral politics
in recent years (Jaffrelot 2003), and to the current Congress Party government which was
(unfairly) seen to be less favorable to capital and was creating new laws to slow the rapid
exploitation of natural resources, such as the one represented by Vedanta in the previous
pages. This was part of the behavior that was recast as ‘corruption’, a word whose
essentially indefinable character made it easy to associate it with any attempt to stop the
ongoing liberalization of the economy (Muralidharan 2011, Rajagopal 2011).
Needless to say, no such crisis materialized in real life, and the movement existed
primarily as a purely ‘civil society’ moment in the semiotic realm. Unable to articulate
any relation to the symbolic struggles that ordinary Indians did indeed wage against
official corruption in daily life, it remained a purely media-created movement that lived
by the media and eventually died by it. Even as the reports of revolution reached a shrill
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crescendo on television, the movement was already dead, a victim of falling viewership
as the audience moved on to the next big thing, which happened to be a new (also mediacreated) cricket tournament. The opportune timing of the movement has been pointed out
as a factor in its success, coming as it did between the triennial cricket World Cup on one
end and the new made-for-television Indian Premier League cricket tournament on the
other. However, politics in other non-televised domains still took place in other parts of
the country, some like in Telangana creating actual crises of the nation-state through its
challenge to the basis of the political divisions of the republic, and others such as in
Kashmir, questioning the Indian state’s legitimacy through mass violence and civil
disobedience.
Anna Hazare’s fast-unto-death, which precipitated the ‘crisis’ of the anticorruption movement has also been compared to another indefinite fast, which was met
not with gushing television anchors, but with arrest and force-feeding. This was the fast
of Irom Sharmila, a political activist from the northeastern state of Manipur who had not
consumed food or water for the last decade, even as Hazare was preparing for his own
televised fast which lasted four days. Irom Sharmila’s action was in protest against the
massacre of civilians in Manipur by the Indian Army (Mehrotra 2009). Her demand was
the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which enables such violence by
paramilitary troops in certain parts of India and has normalized the brutalization of whole
populations by Indian soldiers. She has been kept alive through forcible feeding by the
state administration and is under arrest for attempted suicide. Now largely out of the
public eye, her fast briefly came to national attention during Hazare’s own as a
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comparison, but only as a sideshow, since the media lacked the language necessary for
this symbolic act to be a legitimate narrative element on its own.
The ‘national’ is thus an element of civil society discourse that is purely semiotic,
and exists only within the narratives of the ‘national’ television channels, mainly in the
English language. Lacking an actual public, the media construct one of their own and are
thus suspended in what Homi Bhabha, citing Althusser, calls “space without places, time
without duration” (Bhabha 1990): an instance of the media as a pure semiotic,
unencumbered even by an audience they can call their own.
The response of the English language media to the ‘hate speech’ case of
Akbaruddin Owaisi, a Muslim politician from Hyderabad qualifies this idea of the
‘national’ further4. Owaisi, one of the leaders of the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, an
avowedly Muslim political party in the city of Hyderabad was addressing a political rally
in December 2012. A few days previously, a controversy over an illegally constructed
Hindu temple in the city had led to a rally by a Hindu nationalist organization called the
Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) , whose leader Praveen Togadia threatened to let loose
hundreds of thousands of volunteers to demolish mosques if the temple in question was
not allowed to expand. He was referring directly to the demolition by the VHP and its
sister organizations of the sixteenth-century Babri mosque in northern India in 1992
despite a massive police presence at the site (Hansen 1999, Nandy et al 1997), and
obliquely to the killing of over a thousand Muslims in the western state of Gujarat
(Varadarajan 2002, Engineer 2003) also by the same organizations with the cooperation
of the local police. Owaisi, in his response, called for the police to stand aside so that the
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See ‘Now that Owaisi is in jail, how about Praveen Togadia?’ by Mahtab Alam at
http://kafila.org/2013/01/09/now-that-owaisi-is-in-jail-how-about-praveen-togadia-mahtab-alam
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Muslims could face the VHP volunteers on their own. It was both a rhetorical flourish, as
well as a critical reference to the generally accepted fact that the police are largely
sympathetic to Hindu right-wing organizations and did not attempt to stop violence
against Muslims on numerous occasions since then.
However, Owaisi’s remarks were immediately seized upon by the television news
as a grave provocation and incitement to violence. Labeled ‘hate speech’, the impression
created was of a dangerous threat to public order, despite the fact that no violence had
actually occurred or showed any signs of occuring. Owaisi was arrested and sent to
prison for two weeks, while Togadia’s speeches, and susequent appearances as well, went
unremarked and unreported. The religious basis of the nation as discourse is clearly
evident from the choice of elements that make up the daily narrative of the news. The
nation, through the silent invocation of a normative citizen-subject is largely coded as
Hindu, with Muslims existing as a visible minority on sufferance. The visibility of the
Muslim other is emphasized in order to buttress the Hindu-ness of the nation, and
narratives like Owaisi’s perceived ‘hate speech’ are essential elements of the banal
construction of the Muslim as terrorist. The religious identity of the citizen is also
foregrounded through other genres of national television: almost all television fiction,
mainly in the form of daily soap operas in Hindi, consists of Hindu protagonists, who live
in a place without location and are always upper-caste, Hindi-speaking north Indians.
This caste, religious, region and linguistic identity continues in advertising and
commercial messages, in other non-fiction shows such as studio-based reality programs,
talk shows, music and variety programs and others.
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The essential difference between the postcolonial context and the Western media
environment lies in this vast gulf that separates the symbolic and semiotic in the
postcolonial world, as seen in the gap between the ostensibly national media in India,
both in other media spheres, as well as in real life in general. The crux of this disparity
lies in the location of the national media: in the non-place of civil society, itself exisitng
in an endless loop of signifying practices such as the nation-form and the citizen-subject.
While life in political society goes on through the practices and processes of democracy,
it is absent from the discourse of the national media, which only has space for the
modernity represented by civil society.
A theory of the media in this context would therefore need to be located firmly in
the domain of the symbolic, which requires a fundamentally different perspective on the
media in India. Instead of the ‘Indian media’, the scholar would have to recognize that
the nation is irrelevant when it comes to the symbolic domain of political society, and the
many and diverse public spheres that political society includes are reflected, not in the
vacuous empty discourse of the national media, but in the thriving local, regional and
vernacular media narratives that completely eschew any discourse that involves the
nation. As the previous chapters argued, the role of the media theorist cannot be separated
from the theorist of politics, in an age where politics is mainly a media discourse. Any
scope of politcal action is also therefore an action in the realm of the mass media.
A politics that is against the increasing spread of capitalist modernity through the
postcolonial world still has the potential to destabilize the logic of capital where it is
weakest, in the non-modern spaces where there is still a symbolic struggle with reality
and where politics is not subsumed into the semiotic. This is the domain of political
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society in the postcolonial world. A media theory that begins here and takes seriously the
media sphere engendered through political society has a much greater chance of arriving
at a meaningful understanding of communication as it actually happens. As the next
chapter argues, such a theoretical intervention is also best placed to radically destabilize
the domain of the semiotic and the discourses of he nation, modernity and capital that are
contained within it.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SYMBOLIC CHALLENGE: POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF A RADICAL
REFUSAL

I. The Symbolic Demand and the Question of Media Theory
Baudrillard’s notion of the recovery of the symbolic gives us a starting point to try
to salvage the potential of a radical media theory even as human communication is
subsumed by the semiotic domain. The incompleteness of this subsumption in the nonwest, in the form of Chatterjee’s political society, gives Baudrillard’s attempt a greater
urgency and relevance than it has in the fully subsumed West.
This concluding chapter addresses two related issues that arise with the
juxtaposition of the politics of the symbolic with the existence of political society in
India. The first is the question of media theory itself, which until now has been concerned
primarily with the questions of representation in a narrow and banal sense, that of textual
elements corresponding to observable types in the world. In its place I would like to posit
that a more relevant media theory for the postcolonial world is a theory that foregrounds
the absences of representation in some parts of the media, and the excess of
representation in others, thus bringing to light the invisible line in media studies between
the media forms that are purely semiotic with those that have a connection to the
symbolic realm. If communication is to become symbolic exchange, rather then the play
of signifiers, then the concern of media theorists has to be with the mediation of the
symbolic, which is absent in the media, rather than with the semiotic, which is everpresent. The second, and to my mind the more important question is the question of the
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mass media itself, in terms of its practices and location. Baudrillard’s work challenges us
to question the disconnect between the mass media and the symbolic representation of the
real, a disconnect that is all the more relevant and significant in the colonized world. To
overcome this disconnect, a truly radical media will have to avoid the trap of semiosis, of
becoming part of the civil society discourse of the (post-)colonial public sphere, and
develop forms of existence and idioms of exchange that are grounded in the democratic
spaces of political society.
Baudrillard’s concern with the recovery of the symbolic is an essential aspect of
his radical communication politics. This recovery involves the recognition of current
media practices as existing in a purely semiotic domain, and dependent on the non-event
for their narrative content. Studies of the media in terms of actually existing content fall
into the trap of being mired within the semiotic and becoming part of the play of
signifiers that refer only to themselves. Unfortunately most scholarship under the media
studies, television studies or mass communication rubrics is currently of this kind: studies
of signifying practices, textual elements, audience reactions, narrative and aesthetic
conventions and policy studies. Even studies that are ostensibly broader in scope restrict
themselves to a framework of politcal economy, ownership or production-centered
analyses, thereby missing the deeper and more fundamental truth about the media-form
and its relationship to reality on the one hand, and to the domain of symbolic exchange or
actual human communication on the other.
Studies that do engage with the kind of meta-theoretical framework that
Baudrillard proposes are few and far between. Baudrillard’s work itself draws on three
important figures in this tradition. In its emphasis on form over content, it echoes the
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Canadian theorist Marshall McLuhan’s ideas about the influence of media on society,
although McLuhan’s work is far more equivocal about the politcal prospects inherent in
this perspective.
Another deep influence is form the marginal work of Daniel Boorstin, whose
work The Image provides Baudrillard with the notion of the pseudo-event, an event that
only takes place within a specialized mass media realm but becomes part of the accepted
narrative of reality. Baudrillard’s concept of the semiotic borrows this idea to posit the
non-event which he says is the actual building block of the media narratives in the age of
sign value and the stage of capitalism that is dependent on the consumption of signs,
rather than production. This is also the concept that prompted his series of essays on the
Gulf War, which led to a basic misunderstanding of his work and ideas in the anglophone
academic context. In those essays, published in English as The Gulf War Did Not Take
Place, Baudrillard attacks the mass media narratives of the war as creating non-events, a
simulation of the war that would prove to be more ‘real’ than what actually took place on
the ground. His argument is to emphasize the simulacral nature of the Gulf War on
television, where it is disconnected with the symbolic existence of the war on the ground
in Iraq, and therefore exists in a semiotic domain of war narratives. In this process, the
actual war, that could have existed within and through a symbolic representation is lost to
the television audience, who thereby become merely consuming spectators of the media
spectacle of war. In this sense, Baudrillard also owes a good deal of his theoretical
concepts to Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle, although he differs from Debord as to
the political potential the spectacle represents.
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Baudrillard’s simulacrum is also useful in terms of measuring the political
possibilities that are available in a mediatized capitalist environment. In a world, where
all human communication is mediated through the simulacrum, political acts are
themselves only recognized as legitimate if they take place within the simulacrum. A
symbolic challenge to the semiotic domain is impossible through the usual discourses of
radical politics, since those discourses also exist in the realm of signifying practices only.
By reducing all human communication to signs, capital has subsumed politics into its
semiotic domain as well. Baudrillard’s solution is to engage in a potlatch of sorts in this
scenario. He urges a politics of excess, of a challenge that increases the stakes for capital
through a challenge in the realm of the semiotic, and a refusal to engage in the semiotic
political acts that capital provides as the only political possibility. The answer for
Baudrillard lies in the absence of events, in understanding why something does not take
place (in the semiotic), rather than to engage with the things that do. To refuse to respond
to the questions posed by the semiotic realm also requires a refusal to occupy the role of
the audience or the spectator in the form that the semiotic requires. For him, the semiotic
realm that the media constructs on the ruins of the symbolic that it has destroyed is also
the realm of non-communication, where only a simulated interplay of signifiers is
enabled by the new semiotic, even as the lost field of human communication, which was
once peopled by humans exchanging symbolic representations is now replaced with the
silent masses, an implosion of the symbolic into itself. To Baudrillard, the masses
represent a much more radical potential of subverting the trajectory of the semiotic, than
any participation in the semiotic process ever can. The masses, the ‘silent majorities’ that
overshadow the new simulacral communication enabled by the media, are the repository
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of the imploded social that could still serve as the location for a new politics, but a
politics based on the refusal to play a role, a refusal to participate or even ‘communicate’
and a refusal to engage in semiotic political speech. Baudrillard likens politics in the
semiotic to the surveys and questionnaires that are beloved of marketing professionals,
and for him the only meaningful response is a lack of response. While the semiotic can
subsume any political challenge that is thrown at it and make it part of the semiotic, it
cannot engage with silence or a lack of response or participation.
“We will not destroy the system by a direct, dialectical revolution of the economic or political
infrastructure. Everything produced by contradiction, by the relation of forces, or by energy in
general, will only feed back into the mechanism and give it impetus, following a circular distortion
similar to a Moebius strip. We will never defeat it by following its own logic of energy,
calculation, reason and revolution, history and power, or some finality or counter-finality. The
worst violence at this level has no purchase, and will only backfire against itself. We will never
defeat the system on the plane of the real: the worst error of all our revolutionary strategies is to
believe that we will put an end to the system on the plane of the real: this is their imaginary,
imposed on them by the system itself, living or surviving only by always leading those who attack
the system to fight amongst each other on the terrain of reality, which is always the reality of the
system. This is where they throw all their energies, their imaginary violence, where an implacable
logic constantly turns back into the system. We have only to do it violence or counter-violence
since it thrives on symbolic violence not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found
fortune, as a violence 'of signs', from which the system draws strength, or with which it 'masks' its
material violence: symbolic violence is deduced from a logic of the symbolic (which has nothing
to do with the sign or with energy): reversal, the incessant reversibility of the counter-gift and,
conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift.” (Baudrillard 1993, p.36)

Faced with the total subsumption of the symbolic in Western societies however,
Baudrillard’s later work is more pessimistic in terms of political possibility of the silent
majorities. He evolves his expectation of politics in the west to a potlatch of excessive
response to the semiotic as well: a response that involves excessive speech, excessive
consumption and an excess of participation that can lead to the overloading of the
simulacrum and lead to its collapse. In other words, he sees new political possibilities in
the simulacrum itself, and a politics that increases the stakes, throwing the semiosis of the
simulacral realm back at itself to a point of ultimate simulation where the semiotic
domain can no longer find an adequate response and is forced to collapse and
	
  

95

	
  

acknowledge the symbolic. His work on the 2011 attacks on the World Trade Center
draw on this new potlatch driven politics to understand the spectacular terrorism of the
attacks as one way of the simulacrum challenging itself, and thus collapsing under the
weight of that ultimate challenge.
Baudrillard’s idea of what media theory should be is also based on a similar
understanding of using the symbolic weapon of the potlatch to attack the semiotic
subsumption of the real. His vision of theory is that it should be not merely an attempt at
truthful reality or description, but to leap beyond the current context to a prescriptive
mode of truth-seeking. It has to avoid the current truth to arrive at the future ahead of
actual events. This is only way that theory can challenge the semiotic nature of society:
by engaging with what is not there, and what could or should be. A theory that is merely
engaged with the observable reality is for Baudrillard a theory that has already failed,
since its truth claims are both mired in the semiotic domain and also obsolete as the
semiotic moves faster than the theorist can anticipate. The many shelves of media
scholarship that is now of mainly historical interest are testimony to the truth of
Baudrillard’s assertion.
In India, Baudrillard’s understanding of the symbolic and semiotic maps very
neatly onto existing concerns in Indian political theory about a polity that is always
already split because of factors located in its colonial history. The creation of a class of
Indians who were collaborators of colonial rule also led to the creation of the civil society
composed of this class. The idea of a nation-state, the “imaginary institution” of India, in
Kaviraj’s words, came from the colonial encounter with this class. The form of the nation
is thus historically determined through this civil society and it is where the nation is and

	
  

96

	
  

has always been located. Most theorists of the Indian polity, while holding divergent
views about all other aspects of politics, do coalesce around the common idea that the
public sphere in India, where political discourse is located is not a unitary thing, but is
split irredeemably into mutually unintelligible spheres, whose only common link is
through the structures and institutions of the state. Theorists of the Indian media, whether
of television or of cinema, also recognize that the Indian public exists in two domains, or
as two separate and unequal publics, with little in common between them.
Given the existence of this divided public sphere, or rather of two sets of publics,
Chatterjee’s usage of civil and political society, and the logics of modernity and
democracy to name these publics is thus a useful and essential element in formulating an
Indian theory of the media. The question that arises then is of the nature and role of this
media in material terms , and the role of media theory in such a context.
In the divided polity of India, there are three salient characteristics that any theory of
the media has to consider:
1. The significance of language: there is no Indian media as such, just as there is no
actual public sphere in India: there is however an English language media which
has its own public sphere, a Hindi media with its own sphere with both laying
claims to a national location. The difference between the two is that the English
media is a public sphere without an actual public, and is therefore a purely
semiotic entity. The Hindi, for all its claims to a national perspective is still the
media of the northern Hindi speaking publics, and is responsive to the political
and social exigencies of these publics. (Rajagopal 2001, Naregal 2002). At the
same time, as media forms, both occupy a location in the civil society discourse of
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the nation and of capitalist modernity. They may therefore be said to occupy
divergent semiotic realms, where the signifiers are different but with certain
characteristics in their valorization of he nation-form and of modernity.
2. The significance of the provincial: Each regional (non-Hindi) language
community is a public sphere of its own and is home to its own mediation
processes. The linguistic diversity of the subcontinent and the federal nature of
the polity (which has increased in intensity in recent years) lends itself to the
existence of multiple spheres with different relationships to the hegemonic
discourse of the nation-form. All these public spheres have their own discourses
of politics and their own narratives of symbolic representation. Given their
subordinate relationship to the nation-form and the Hindi publics, they may be
thought of as provincial public spheres.	
  
3. The significance of the divided polity: As Kaviraj points out, the nationalist
movement was born of a diglossia reflected in the national bourgeoisie’s
relationship to English on the one hand and the vernacular on the other, and this
diglossia ultimately led to the sundering of connections between the vernacular
realms themselves, except as could be mediated through the nationalist discourse
(Kaviraj 2010). This lies at the root of the current divided nature of the Indian
polity, between an elite ‘national’ civil society and the multiple, localized
domains of political society. The tragedy of colonialism lies in the erasure of
connections between and among the members of political society, which can be
thought of as part of the lost symbolic realm, and replaces these connections with
the mediation of civil society. Thus, the multiple political societies are unable to
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create and maintain a real and thriving public sphere, indeed are unable to even
call into being a truly representative public or publics, because the links between
the spheres are broken. The only way to communicate among them is to seek
recourse to the discursive structures of civil society and its alien idiom of
modernity. The only truly ‘national’ entity is thus the civil society, divorced from
the logic of democracy or from the logic of symbolic representation. Any theory
of the media that takes the nation-form for a given is thus caught in the semiotic
trap of civil society, even as actual communication is still taking place in the vast
diversity of political society, despite the absence of a relevant mass mediation
structure or process.	
  
Addressing the absence of the symbolic in the media is similar in many ways to the
question that animated the original Subaltern Studies scholars: the absence of the nonmodern in colonial discourses. The Subaltern historians were concerned mainly without
overcoming the deliberate erasure of the ‘peasant consciousness’ from both the
nationalist historiography that dominated the intellectual space in the postcolonial Indian
academy. To them, this consciousness still existed in the silences and absences of
colonial source texts, and had to be teased out through what was unsaid and unwritten. If
we consider the study of the mass media to be in some sense a historiography of the
present, the project for a radical media theory is similar to that of the historians: to invoke
the absent narratives and silent voices, rather than to amplify through examination the
loud presence of the semiotic.
The challenge of the divided polity thus provides us with a starting point of what a
truly radical mediation process in India, or in any postcolonial context would need to do:
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engage with the lost domain of the symbolic in order to restore the connections between
the members of political society, so that the process of mediation represents a true
technological intervention into actual symbolic exchange, rather than a futile play of
signification. This requires a stepping away from the primacy and hegemony of the
nation-form and a re-entry into the localized domains of politics. It also requires a delegitimization of the politics of civil society, centered as it is on the discursive hegemony
of parliamentary forms, legality and public order, the nation-state and other such
elements of a colonial/capitalist modernity. In their place, it would need to restore to
importance the symbolic elements that modernity tries to erase: the affective issues of
identity and subjectivity, the localized relationships to a collective and its consciousness,
the elements of lived reality such as the natural environment and the diverse systems of
language, thought and belief. These characteristics of the symbolic cannot be restored
through the monolingual nature of modernity which only recognizes the primacy of a
single identity, selfhood or subjectivity encoded in a single hegemonic language. The
symbolic requires a media that is open to the plurality of human experience that
characterizes the actually existing quotidian ‘politics of the governed’ that Chatterjee
defines as democracy.

II. The Symbolic Demand as Political Practice
The radical Durkheimian tradition, which has also influenced Baudrillard’s
concept of the symbolic refers to this domain as the ‘sacred’, and it is in many ways a
recovery of the sacred that can destabilize and de-legitimize the discourse of capitalist
modernity. The erasure of the symbolic domain takes place also because of the
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disappearance of the sacred from human experience and human communication, and
thereby from social relations and society in general. Here, the ‘sacred’ of course refers
not a religious or spiritual domain, but to the non-modern, anti-utilitarian logic of the gift
economy that animates the process of symbolic exchange and therefore gives meaning to
human communication; in contrast to the profane realm of capitalist modernity,
concerned as it is mainly with value, productivity and accumulation.
The road to a recovery of the symbolic and the creation of a symbolic system of
mediation however goes through the destruction of the semiotic realm, and here again, it
is Baudrillard’s politics of refusal and silence that serves to show the way. In the semiotic
realm of the media as it exists today, actual human communication in the form of
symbolic is absent, the media are thus means of non-communication rather than
communication. Actual communication is only found in the absences and silences in the
semiotic, in the events that do not take place, rather than the ones that do and can be seen.
These absent events are the silent signifiers of the actually existing politics that is still
occuring everyday but in another domain. Faced with the silence of the media the
strategy of a radical passivity by its mass audience seems especially appropriate. By
removing itself from the responsibility of answering to the media, by refusing to respond
to its demands, by playing its role of the silent mass, the ‘silent majority’ actually
engages in a more radical gesture than any pretension of an ‘active audience’ or any
positive critical action of protest would allow.
“To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death.
Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only
chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when
encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what
can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge
of death and suicide.” (Baudrillard 1993, p. 37).
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The idea of a refusal as political practice is not to be understood in a negative
sense as the denial of politics itself, but as a necessary means of creating a new
paradigmatic context for a different mode of politics. This is similar to the Autonomous
Marxists’ position on the ‘refusal to work’ as a radical practice, such as Paolo Virno’s
idea of the exit, which “changes the context within which a problem arises, rather than
deals with the problem by choosing one or another of the alternative solutions already on
offer” (Virno 1996). As Kathi Weeks argues about the refusal of work as a liberatory
mode of politics,
“The refusal can make time and open spaces both physical and conceptual within which to
construct alternatives. Rather than a simple act of disengagement that one completes, the refusal
is, in this sense, a process, a theoretical and practical movement that aims to effect a separation
through which we can pursue alternative practices and relationships”. (Weeks, 2011, p. 100)

Baudrillard’s idea of theory as a form of potlatch with the profanity of reality is
also a useful way to think about the relevance of media and communication theory in this
context. A radical theory of the media in the postcolonial context would have to
foreground the absence of communication in the media and thus engage critically with
what is not and cannot be found in the media, what lies outside and beyond its narratives,
in the realm of politics and symbolic representation. A theory of the media that is
concerned only with the media itself is a theory of nothing at all, except of a closed loop
of signifiers. This is particularly relevant to the postcolonial context and to India, where
the symbolic realm is present in the form of political society and is a thriving source of
democratic politics and discourse, yet is absent and silent in the narratives of the mass
media. A new theory of the media that is more concerned with the truth of human
communication than the media as they currently exist will thus need to engage with the
forms of communication that political society engenders daily. It will also need to engage
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critically with the idiom of political society which is the means of symbolic exchange. In
other words, a theory of the media in the postcolonial world will have to become the
theory of the media as it should be, not of the media as it is. This is the meaning of the
impossible exchange that Baudrillard envisages, where theory is always locked in an
escalating series of challenges to its object of study. A theory of the media should take
the form of a challenge to the media, rather than be a mere a posteriori description. For
Baudrillard, the challenge of theory to its object is a way of challenging conceptions of
the real in order to provoke an escalation of truth-claims, to create a situation where it is
reality which will need to rise to the challenge of theory, rather than the other way
around.
In sum, a theory of the media that locates itself in the discourses of politcal
society, that concerns itself with the everyday practice of politics and that engages
critically with the domain of symbolic exchange will emerge as a true theory of human
communication. In the context of the postcolonial polity, such a theory will need to begin
as the theory of political society and its idiom of democracy. Ultimately, the intervention
of such a theory may be the challenge necessary to push the semiotic realm to rise to
meet its demands. The end of such a demand will always be the construction of new
public spheres that are responsive and responsible to their publics, where the language of
media discourse is the same as the idiom of democratic politics.
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